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Simultaneously achieving climate protection, energy security and economic development to address 
the long-term wellbeing of individuals, while reducing their exposure to significant environmental risks 
and challenges, is at the core of the low-carbon policy agenda worldwide.
Forecast to be one of the largest energy consumers and energy-related CO
2
 emitters in the near future, 
the Mexican economy is particularly concerned by the urgent need for a rapid shift towards low-carbon 
development pathways, which involve switching to sustainable energy systems. 
To assess the opportunities associated with transitioning to a low-carbon economy and avoid the 
potentially high costs of this transition, what is lacking or insufficiently developed is a robust research 
framework, which allows to investigate alternative future pathways of the energy, environmental and 
technology dimensions of developmental challenges and their solutions.
This study aims to provide such a framework by offering a dynamic general equilibrium modeling 
analysis that quantitatively builds the link between the energy economy and the environment in 
Mexico. As such, its purpose is to inform the design of effective policy aimed at promoting sustainable 
environmental management while still boosting economic growth in the medium- and long-term. 
To do so, the study develops a Mexican version of the Multi-sector Macroeconomic Model for the 
Evaluation of Environmental and Energy policy (Three-ME) and uses it to assess the long-term effect 
of policy measures implemented under Mexico’s “Climate Change Law” (e.g., carbon tax) on the energy 
sector’s structure and dynamics, on related greenhouse gas emissions, and on economic activity. The 
study takes the next step of assessing the redistributive effects of alternative policy scenarios, each 
 reflecting a different strategy for recycling tax revenues. 
Interestingly, it is found that implementing a carbon tax on the Mexican economy acts so as to curb 
carbon emissions while still increasing social welfare, under certain carbon tax revenue recycling schemes. 
These findings support the double-dividend hypothesis, which assumes that “green” taxation allows to 
simultaneously achieve environmental and socio-economic goals.
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5Abstract
This document offers an empirical application of the notion of energy transition to the Mexican 
economy and it takes the next step of simulating medium- and long-term impacts of proposed 
and future energy and fiscal policy on the environment and the Mexican economy. The starting 
point of the analysis is the ThreeME framework, a Multi-sectoral Macroeconomic Model based 
on Keynesian theory. It is designed to address the dynamics of global economic activity, energy 
system development and carbon emissions causing climate change. The ThreeME model is well-
suited for policy assessment purposes in the context of developing economies as it informs the 
transitional effects of policy intervention. In particular, disequilibrium can arise in the form of 
involuntary unemployment, the inertia of technical systems and rigidity in labor and energy markets 
as a result of delayed market clearing in the goods markets and slow adjustment between prices and 
quantities over the simulation time path.
Calibrated to updated sectoral and aggregated national accounts data, a Mexican version of the 
ThreeME has been developed and accounts for 24 commodities – including 3 energy sources – and 
32 sectors, with an explicit distinction between 11 energy sectors and 7 transport sectors. Electricity 
production is disaggregated into 9 technologies: hydro, geothermal, wind, solar, biomass, nuclear, 
coal-based, oil-based and gas-based. The ThreeME-Mexico model is used to gauge the economic 
and environmental effects of energy and fiscal policy measures in Mexico (namely the phasing-out 
of energy subsidies and the implementation of a carbon tax). Different policy scenarios are assessed, 
each reflecting a different strategy of fiscal revenue recycling. We consider fiscal policy (in the 
form of carbon taxation) for Mexico’s energy transition and simulate how alternative government 
schemes for transferring tax revenues impact the Mexican economy and its carbon emissions. The 
level of the carbon tax is endogenously computed to meet the national emissions reduction targets 
set out in Mexico’s Climate Change Law.
In line with a scenario that we name the “IDEAL scenario”, we consider emission cuts of 40% by 
2030 and 50% by 2050, as compared with the baseline and 2000 levels respectively. This requires 
carbon tax to reach US$100/tCO
2
 in 2030 and US$700/tCO
2
 in 2050. We take the case of no tax 
compensation for this first scenario. Because of substitution effects in energy-intensive production 
inputs and consumption goods, the policy successfully reduces CO
2
 emissions by 75% by 2050 with 
respect to the baseline or business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. But the environmental goal is achieved 
at a very high economic cost, with GDP dropping approximately 8% after 2040 compared to the 
reference scenario.
We then test the hypothesis of a full redistribution of carbon tax revenues among consumers 
(by reducing household income tax) and producers (by compensating for social security payroll 
taxes), which appears to be a way of reconciling environmental and economic goals. It is shown that 
6this pattern of revenue transfer has beneficial impacts both on GDP and CO
2
 emissions reduction. 
With respect to the no-redistribution scenario, the gains on emissions reduction are slightly 
lower (a 72% as opposed to a 75% decrease in emissions) because of rebound effects: increased 
economic activity from redistribution leads to enhanced production and consumption, which 
ultimately drives up energy use. Our results support the notion that promoting a carbon tax is 
compatible with both environmental and economic gains.
Sensitivity tests are undertaken, including the utilization of alternative parameter values for the 
alternative substitution mechanisms. It is found that CO
2
 emissions reduction is low when the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and energy is constant (in absence of endogenous energy 
efficiency) and when the elasticity of substitution across types of commodities is low. Moreover, 
the economic gains from the tax crucially depend on the inflationary pressure resulting from the 
taxation policy (and therefore on the wage-setting process) and on the responsiveness of Mexico’s 
economy to foreign competition.
This document is the result of a two-year research collaboration involving the Mexican National 
Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC), the French Economic Observatory (OFCE) and 
Agence Française de Développement (AFD).
71  Introduction
Global warming represents a major threat for the development and prosperity of humanity. 
According to the Fifth Assessment of the IPCC (2014), the current emission trends of greenhouse 
gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate 
system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and 
ecosystems. The same report indicates that surface temperature is projected to rise over the 
21st century under all assessed emission scenarios and that it is very likely that heat waves will 
occur more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will become more 
intense and frequent in many regions. Finally, it concludes that climate change will amplify existing 
risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. These risks are unevenly distributed 
and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of 
development (IPCC, 2014).
Current United Nations efforts aim at developing a new approach that is to replace the Kyoto 
Protocol and would require all nations to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Reducing 
GHG emissions will entail the cooperation of at the least those fifteen countries (including large 
emerging economies like China, India, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and South Africa) and one region 
(the European Union) that together account for some 80% of global carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO
2
e) emissions. The new global agreement seeks to limit the average global temperature rise 
to below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels as a prerequisite to avoiding dangerous climate 
change. According to a World Bank report on carbon pricing trends (World Bank, 2014), global 
GHG emissions reached approximately 50 gigatons of CO
2
e (GtCO
2
e) in 2010 and are projected 
to climb to 59 GtCO
2
e by 2020. The report also states that the international community needs to 
reduce GHG emissions by 15 GtCO
2
e to reach 44 GtCO
2
e in order to limit temperature rises to 2°C 
during the 21st century.
Achieving the United Nations emissions reduction target would reduce economic growth by about 
0.06% annually from now until 2100, according to the IPCC (IPCC, 2014). This cost projection 
assumes optimal conditions such as the immediate implementation of a common global price 
or tax on carbon dioxide emissions, a significant expansion of nuclear power and the advent and 
widespread use of new, low-cost technologies to control emissions and provide cleaner sources of 
energy.
Faced with this scenario, tackling climate change means it is crucial to extend emissions reductions 
and lower their cost. This requires the implementation of market and economic instruments as well 
as regulatory frameworks and, moreover, all these policies will need to complement each other. 
Given the considerable financial resources required and the limited public funds available to address 
the problem, carbon-pricing instruments are essential.
8Within this context, Mexico is both vulnerable[1] to climate change and an important contributor 
to the problem.[2] This vulnerability stems partly from the country’s geographical characteristics, 
including drastically uneven distribution of precipitation between northern and southern regions. 
A factor that further aggravates this vulnerability is the high inequality in income distribution, which 
places half of its population in different degrees of poverty.[3] Development based on fossil fuel 
exploitation has led to environmental degradation and public health problems nationwide. The high 
dependency of Mexico’s economic growth on crude oil production and fossil fuel consumption 
presents serious challenges to the implementation of both mitigation and adaptation measures.
1 1   Technical cooperation between INECC-AFD-OFCE
Energy resources are essential inputs for most economic activities. Understanding the dynamics 
of anthropogenic climate change means taking into account the complex relationship between 
economic activity and environmental impact linked to fossil fuel consumption and GHG emissions. 
On the one hand, the level of economic activity determines the technological progress of production 
processes and consumption patterns. It promotes the innovation and diffusion of more efficient 
technologies that can satisfy the same level of activity with less environmental damage. On the other 
hand, it determines the capital available for investment in infrastructure used by energy-intensive 
activities (i.e., transport and industry). These structural changes require massive investments, which 
in turn require the creation of economic measures that can change patterns of consumption and 
production. These economic measures will have an impact on production costs and thus on the 
competitiveness of the economy and the distribution of household wealth. Considering all the 
aforementioned points, the mitigation of climate change is a complex task requiring economic 
evaluation instruments that can show the different paths, in the medium and long term, of a given 
environmental and economic strategy.
The Multi-sector Macroeconomic Model for the Evaluation of Environmental and Energy policy 
(ThreeME) developed by the French Economic Observatory (OFCE) in collaboration with the 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), and funded by the French 
Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME), makes it possible to analyze this complex 
system. The model has been used in France to estimate the macroeconomic effects of prospective 
scenarios for the 2030–2050 energy transition prepared by ADEME. These prospective scenarios 
provide a vision of energy demand as well as of the energy mix required on the supply side.
Technical cooperation was established between the National Institute of Ecology and Climate 
Change (INECC), an independent technical institute of the Mexican Government, and OFCE with 
the support of Agence Française de Développement (AFD) to develop the ThreeME model for the 
[1] Mexico is particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, droughts and heat waves and 
cold. From 1999–2011, the human losses and economic damage from hydro-meteorological events represented an 
annual average of 154 deaths and 21,368 million pesos (INECC, 2012).
[2] According to the IEA (2012), Mexico is the world’s 14th largest emitter of energy-related CO
2
.
[3] According to CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social), 45.5% of the total 
population in Mexico in 2012 was living in some degree of poverty: http://www.coneval.gob.mx/Medicion/Paginas/
Medici%C3%B3n/Pobreza%202012/Pobreza-2012.aspx
9Mexican economy. This cooperation began in mid-2013 with the objective to provide INECC with 
the appropriate tools for analyzing the country’s energy and climate policies. In this respect, the 
environmental taxes included in the 2014 tax reform are the Mexican Government’s very first step 
towards institutionalizing the mechanisms and economic measures needed to limit GHG emissions. 
Economic evaluation is the key to estimating both the costs and benefits of such measures as well as 
their optimal level, so as to feed the policy debate on the economic and social impact.
The Mexican economy will be modeled using ThreeME, which is a neo-Keynesian dynamic general 
equilibrium model in which prices and quantities adjust slowly to their optimal values; this allows 
transition mechanisms to be identified in the short and medium term. These mechanisms are 
essential for an accurate assessment of the effects on employment and economic activity. Another 
important feature is its hybrid component, since it combines macroeconomic modeling (top-down) 
and technical modeling of energy consumption (bottom-up). This ensures an explicit treatment of 
the effects of decisions regarding the national economy, and takes into consideration direct and 
indirect impacts, such as feedback between prices and quantities and rebound effects. Likewise, the 
multi-sectoral nature of the modeling reveals the effects of an activity transfer from one sector to 
another.
1 2   Structure of the report
The present report is divided into five sections. Section 2 describes Mexico’s national policy on 
climate change. It also provides elements that give further insight into the current Mexican 
economic context as well as the recently approved reforms, in particular the energy reform. This 
section concludes with an overview and outlook of the country’s most important energy sectors. 
Section 3 provides a short description of the ThreeME model and how it has been adapted to 
Mexico. Section 4 presents the simulation results and Section 5 presents the report’s conclusions.

11
2  Mexican context 
and national policy 
on climate change and energy
2 1   Climate change policy
Mexico has been an active player in the search for solutions to climate change in the international 
arena. The progress achieved at Cancun during COP16 is clear evidence of this commitment. 
Mexico advocated that public and private funding be mobilized for the mitigation and adaptation 
of climate change in developing countries under the Green Climate Fund, including technology 
transfer mechanisms, instruments to enhance the transparency of national commitments, and an 
international scheme to reduce deforestation, which includes market mechanisms.
At the national level, climate change is also a major issue on Mexico’s domestic agenda. Mexico 
is one of the few developing countries to have a domestic law that addresses climate change, 
including specific emission targets relative to a baseline scenario in the short term and relative to 
a base year in the long term. It has also published diverse national planning documents such as the 
National Development Plan 2013–2018 (PND, 2013), which includes the topic of climate change, 
the National Climate Change Strategy (ENACC, 2013) and the Special Program on Climate Change 
2014–2018 (PECC, 2014).
2.1.1.  General Law on Climate Change
The General Law on Climate Change (LGCC, 2012) governs the scope and content of the national 
climate change policy. It defines the obligations of the state authorities and of the three levels of 
government. In order to ensure effective coordination between the different levels of government 
and cooperation between public, private and social sectors, the LGCC mandates the integration 
of the National Climate Change System (SINACC). This system should promote synergies to 
jointly tackle the country’s climate-related vulnerability and risks, and identify priority actions 
for mitigation and adaptation actions. The SINACC includes the Inter-ministerial Commission on 
Climate Change (CICC), the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC), the Council 
on Climate Change (C3), the federal states, associations of local authorities and the Congress. In 
terms of mitigation policy, the LGCC sets mitigation targets for Mexico for the years 2020 and 
12
2050. The two targets are a 30% reduction of GHG emissions with reference to a baseline in the 
year 2020 and a 50% reduction relative to emissions in the year 2000.
There had been an earlier Special Program on Climate Change, published in 2009, which launched 
a series of mitigation actions taken by the federal government agencies and aimed at mitigating 
50 million tons of CO
2
e (MtCO
2
e) by 2012. The program included regulations, subsidies and direct 
interventions designed to change the supply side in different economic sectors. The mitigation 
measures ranged from energy efficiency standards to voluntary standards for the construction 
sector. It also included measures for public information, cash-for-clunkers programs for heavy- 
and light-duty vehicles, mandates for the two state energy monopolies (CFE and PEMEX) to 
reduce emissions through investment, and the mass phasing-in of energy-efficient light bulbs and 
equipment. It is important to highlight that this program did not include any economic instruments 
aimed at changing the economic decisions of producers or consumers by internalizing the social 
costs of their emissions. A second climate change program with the same vision was launched under 
the current administration (PECC 2014–2018). This second PECC aims for an 83 MtCO
2
e reduction 
by 2018. All these efforts, though well-intentioned, are not enough to radically shift the now fossil-
fuel dependent economy to a low-carbon economy.
2.1.2. Tax reform
In 2013, Mexico introduced the country’s first carbon tax as part of the economic package for 
the fiscal year 2014. The tax covers about 40% of total GHG emissions nationwide. It is not a tax 
on the total carbon content of fuels but rather on the additional emissions compared to natural 
gas. Natural gas, therefore, is not subject to the carbon tax. This needs to be changed rapidly if a 
real energy transition is to be achieved, since a large supply of natural gas may delay investment in 
renewables and thus block their development.[4] The tax rate varied between 10 and 50 pesos per 
ton of CO
2
 (US$1–4/tCO
2
) in 2014 depending on the fuel type and with a 3% limit on the sales price 
of fuel. According to the Law on Federal Revenues for fiscal year 2014, it was estimated that the 
Federation would receive 14,641.7 million pesos (approximately US$1 billion, representing 0.328% 
of the Federal Government’s total revenue). For the year 2015, revenue of 9,871.8 million pesos 
(0.210% of total revenues) is expected. So far, the revenues from this tax are not earmarked for 
direct investment in environmental measures.
2.1.3. Energy reform
The energy sector has a crucial role to play in the country’s transition to a low-carbon economy. 
The characteristics of the energy supply are closely linked with the emissions of global and local 
pollutants – so much so that if energy dependence on non-renewable fossil fuels is not reduced, any 
energy-efficiency improvements, although welcome, will be inadequate.
[4] According to Davis and Shearer (2014), without new climate policies, the increased supply of natural gas makes energy 
cheaper, thereby encouraging higher energy consumption and discouraging investment in energy efficiency. It also 
competes for market share not only with coal, but also with very low-carbon energy sources such as renewables and 
nuclear.
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In 2014, Mexico approved a series of structural reforms in the power generation sector. The 
recently adopted energy reform offers many opportunities to enhance the generation of clean 
energy. The reform introduces a sustainability mandate stipulating that the State should seek to 
protect the environment through sustainability criteria and promote cleaner energy and fuels. This 
regulation favors the entry of the private sector into the business of producing and selling electricity, 
as well as into transmission and distribution activities – and this more competitive environment 
will help to diversify the energy mix. However, it is also important to mention that the reform is 
expected to boost investment in, and thereby increase, the production of unconventional sources 
of energy such as deep-water oil, heavy and ultra-heavy oil, and in particular tight oil and shale 
gas. These unconventional sources have a lower energy return on investment (EROI) and a higher 
environmental impact. All of these new sources will increase Mexico’s oil and gas production and 
consequently its GHG emissions. If the Government’s projections on the basis of the reform are 
correct, oil and gas production will increase from 2.1 million barrels per day (MMbd) of crude oil to 
3.6 MMbd by 2030 (SENER, 2014a), and this most likely will increase emissions from 87 MtCO
2
e in 
2013 to 150 MtCO
2
e by 2030 (INECC, 2014a).
2 2  Macroeconomic context
Mexico is facing some major economic challenges. In order to escape the middle-income trap, the 
country needs to find a way of increasing its productivity to achieve higher rates of growth. According 
to the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI, 2015a), GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 2.1% 
since 2000, while GDP per capita has grown at a rate of only 0.8%, which translates into approximately 
US$12,130 per capita (2010–2014 World Bank PPP conversion factor) in 2013. This ranks Mexico as the 
economy with the lowest income among OECD countries. Despite a promising outlook for economic 
growth and a demographic dividend, both of which could be exploited in the coming years,[5] there 
are huge barriers to be overcome. According to a McKinsey report (McKinsey Global Institute, 2014), 
Mexico has two economies moving at different speeds. The first is a modern fast-growing Mexico 
with globally competitive multinationals and cutting-edge manufacturing plants that are increasing 
productivity by 5.8% a year. The second is a Mexico of small slow-growing enterprises whose 
productivity is falling by 6.5% a year. The report concludes that Mexico must triple its productivity 
growth from the recent yearly average of 0.8% if it is to increase national growth to above 2.0%.
Past economic reforms were aimed at increasing economic and productivity growth by opening 
up the economy to international trade, but they failed to encourage competition and break up 
the country’s inefficient public and private monopolies. At the same time, if Mexico introduced 
greater competition it would also need to create strong institutions to watch over market rules 
and ensure property rights. To achieve this, the Mexican Government needs to achieve higher rates 
of tax collection, as one of its main problems is the country’s very small tax base. Tax collection in 
Mexico is not only the lowest among OECD countries, but it is also lower than the average in Latin 
America, if oil revenue is not included (OECD, 2010). The dominant role of indirect taxation and 
[5] According to the World Bank, the age dependency rate in Mexico in 2014 was 54. This is defined as the ratio of 
dependents (aged under 15 or over 64) to the working-age population (aged 15–64). It is presented per 100 working-
age population.
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the low level of income tax collection thus contribute to reducing the progressiveness of the tax 
system as a whole.
One key feature of the Mexican economy is that growth is underpinned by the exploitation 
of non-renewable hydrocarbons. Yet, this kind of growth based mainly on oil rents can lead to 
inequalities, since its benefits are only enjoyed by the small well-organized groups that capture this 
rent. Such privileges are perpetuated through the promotion of generalized subsidies, monopolistic 
markets, poor accountability and inadequate regulatory enforcement (Karl, 2007; Schubert, 2006). 
Overall, this results in a huge loss of social welfare, a more polluted environment and a weak 
economy that depends on oil prices and is unable to compete with the high added-value products 
and services from innovative economies.
This weakness is reflected in the major role that the currency exchange rate plays in the Mexican 
economy. Following the 2008 recession, the rate remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 
12 and 14 Mexican pesos against the US dollar. However, in January 2015, with falling international 
oil prices, the Mexican currency, the ‘peso’, reached its lowest level against the US dollar (INEGI, 
2015a) since 2009. In the face of these developments, the Federal Government recently announced 
a budgetary reduction of around 9.5 billion pesos, as well as the cancellation of some infrastructure 
project expenditures for 2015.
The trade balance has also been impacted as, overall, Mexico is a net importer of goods. Although 
Mexico is a net oil exporter, in 2014 its oil imports increased by around 1% compared to 2013, while 
oil exports decreased by 13.5%. As shown in Figure 1, the gap between exports and imports of fossil 
fuels (including crude oil and natural gas) has been narrowing since 2006. Moreover, most of the 
refined oil products consumed in Mexico are imported, whereas the country does not export any 
of these products – which goes to highlight the fact that Mexico is not independent in terms of 
energy production (INEGI, 2015b).
Figure 1  Fossil fuel trade balance, Mexico, 2000–2014
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Despite falling oil production and the heavy reliance on imported refined oil products, especially 
from the United States, general prices in the economy have been kept at adequate levels in recent 
years. Inflation rates in Mexico have been stable for a decade with levels between 3% and 5% per 
year and a 6.5% peak during the 2008 recession. The target inflation rate is 3% and the Mexican 
Central Bank (Banco de México) as an autonomous body is mandated with maintaining this rate. 
Currently, interest rates are at their lowest historical levels at around 3%.
Employment has also been stable in recent years. According to INEGI, only 3.7% of the economically 
active population is unemployed. This is one of the lowest unemployment rates among OECD countries. 
However, 28.3% of the total economically active population come under the ‘informal employment’ 
category (INEGI, 2015b), defined as employees working for enterprises that are either not registered, 
lack accountability or operate on a very small scale. This implies low productivity and low added value 
for at least one-fourth of the total employment, which is naturally detrimental to the economy.
Under this administration, the Federal Government has implemented reforms in different sectors 
to tackle all these issues. Since 2014, amendments have been made to legislation on labor, education, 
fiscal and energy. According to the Federal Government, the implemented reforms aim to promote 
productivity, innovation and quality education, which are key variables when it comes to increasing 
competitiveness.
The labor law reform is designed to modify the labor market structure so as to make hiring more 
flexible and stimulate the creation of new formal jobs, especially for young people and women. 
Meanwhile, educational reform aims to improve the quality of basic education by reducing inequality 
in access to schooling and by improving the quality of education through evaluation of teachers’ 
performance. The tax reform aims to expand tax collection in order to increase public spending 
in priority areas such as education, health, social security and infrastructure. To achieve this, the 
reform proposes to reduce informal employment by simplifying taxes and reducing inequalities in 
the current tax system. It is still too early to say if these reforms will fully yield the expected results. It 
is likely that the adjustments will take time and the question remains of whether Mexico will be able 
to accomplish this before the momentum of its demographic dividend is lost.
2 3  Energy outlook
Mexico’s energy supply relies heavily on fossil fuels. According to the National Balance of Energy 
(BNE, 2013), 88.09% of the total primary energy supply (TPES) in 2013 came from fossil fuels 
(64.29% from oil, 22.68% from natural gas and 1.12% from condensate liquids). Renewable energy 
accounted for 7.05%, nuclear for 1.36% and mineral carbon for 3.51%. Table 1 summarizes the gross 
domestic energy supply by energy source.
Although Mexico remains one of the world’s biggest energy producers (the 10th largest crude 
oil producer), it is still a net importer of natural gas and refined petroleum products to meet its 
domestic energy demand. In 2013, the primary energy trade balance showed a deficit of 7.3% 
compared to 2012. In 2013, the country’s domestic energy consumption in fact attained the same 
level as its domestic energy production for the first time, due to a constant annual reduction in 
energy production of around 0.4% over previous years and a constant 2.3% increase in energy 
consumption since 2005 (BNE, 2013).
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Table 1  Gross domestic supply by energy source (in petajoules, PJ)
2012 2013
Change (%) 
2013/2012
Share (%) 
2013
Total 8,809.36 9,011.83 2.30 100
Coal and coke 554.26 560.85 1.19 6.22
Natural gas and liquefied products 3,626.06 3,834.28 5.74 42.55
Oil and oil products 3,932.76 3,880.19 -1.34 43.06
Nuclear energy 91.32 122.60 34.26 1.36
Renewables 620.22 634.44 2.29 7.04
Net trade of electricity -15.26 -20.54 34.57 0.23
Source: BNE, 2013.
On the demand side, domestic energy consumption grew by 2.3% in 2013 compared to 2012. 
Energy consumption by energy production sector[6] accounted for 33.97% of total domestic 
energy consumption, while final energy consumption accounted for 56.95%. In 2013, final energy 
consumption (i.e., the energy consumed for goods production and final use) increased by 0.6% 
compared to 2012.
Table 2 shows the energy consumption by sector. Transport turns out to be the most energy-
intensive sector accounting for nearly 44% of total energy consumption, followed by industry 
(31%) and the residential and commercial sector (17.72%).
In this increasingly worrisome scenario of energy balance, energy-efficiency measures play a crucial 
role in energy consumption with economic impacts in the public and private sectors, triggering a 
better use of energy resources. So far, the largest impacts on energy efficiency have come through 
highly efficient systems and equipment and better practices. The instruments used to promote 
these include: standards, equipment substitution programs, and information and educational 
programs. According to PRONASE (2014), the energy savings derived from energy-efficiency norms 
(NOM) from 1995 to 2012 stood at 47,508 gigawatt hours (GWh); whereas energy savings from 
programs promoting efficient equipment (e.g. clean fluorescent lamps, CFL, and labeling) accounted 
for 17,000 GWh in consumption and 3,500 MW in demand. In the public sector, energy-efficiency 
programs for public buildings have saved around 5,483 GWh by promoting energy efficiency in the 
operation of buildings and the vehicle fleet used by government institutions.
Energy consumption and economic growth are tightly interlinked and play a key role given that 
harnessing economic development inevitably requires increasing the energy supply to meet future 
needs in the coming years. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012), energy 
[6] This is the energy consumed for conversion purposes (60.3%), i.e., energy used in the processes that convert primary 
energy into secondary energy. It also includes the producers’ own consumption of energy (33.6%), i.e., the energy 
absorbed by equipment supporting the transformation processes. Losses in transmission, transport and distribution 
(6.0%) are also included.
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Table 2  Total final energy consumption (PJ)
2012 2013
Change (%)
2013/2012
Share (%)
2013
Total final Consumption 5,100.35 5,132.32 0.63 100
Total non-energy consumption 200.05 190.91 -4.57 3.72
PEMEX petrochemical branch 112.56 136.53 21.30 2.66
Other branches 87.49 54.38 -37.84 1.06
Total energy consumption 4,900.30 4,941.41 0.84 96.28
Transport 2,298.82 2,262.28 -1.59 44.08
Industry 1,522.30 1,612.31 5.91 31.41
Residential, commercial and public 920.73 909.22 -1.25 17.72
Agriculture and livestock 158.45 157.6 -0.54 3.07
Source: BNE (2013)
Figure 2  Energy balance trend
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demand will continue to rise at an average 1.5% a year until 2035, assuming an expansion of the 
global economy of around 140% and a population increase of 1.7 billion.[7] According to the Mexican 
National Energy Strategy 2013–2027 (ENE, 2013), the average energy consumption growth rate 
over the last decade has been higher than the GDP growth rate, in general terms as well as per 
capita, i.e., growth today is more expensive than ten years ago in terms of energy consumption. In 
fact, Mexico’s energy demand could increase by more than 50% by 2027 with respect to energy 
demand in 2011 (see Figure 2).
2 4  Key energy sectors
2.4.1. Electricity sector
Over the past fifty years, the national electric system has been controlled by the Federal 
Government through the Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE), a state monopoly responsible for 
the supervision, generation, transmission and commercialization of electricity nationwide. Electricity 
has thus been produced in a non-competitive environment, where prices are not determined by 
market criteria. This has led to net losses for the CFE, weak competitiveness and low investment in 
infrastructure, as well as in high subsidies mostly for residential and agricultural customers. Under 
this scheme, central planning has focused mainly on fossil-fuel-based technologies, especially natural 
gas, and thus fostered an undiversified system that is vulnerable to fuel availability and price volatility.
In 2012, the sub-sector of electricity generation, transmission and distribution accounted for a 3% 
share of GDP (PROMEXICO, 2013) and employed 127,252 people (INEGI, 2015d), i.e., 0.25% of the 
economically active population. Exports accounted for 2.2% of GDP, imports 2.5% and foreign 
direct investment 0.3% (PROMEXICO, 2013). Regarding energy consumption, the electricity sector 
accounted for 27% of national energy consumption in 2013, with 81.7% of power generation based 
on fossil-fuel technologies (50.6% natural gas, 18.9% oil products and 12.3% coal), 4.6% based on 
nuclear and the remaining 13.7% on renewable energy (10.6% hydro, 2.4% geothermal and 1% wind) 
(SENER, 2013a). In terms of GHG emissions, the power generation sector emitted 126.6 MtCO
2
e in 
2013 (INECC, 2014a), representing 26% of total GHG emissions in the country, and was the second 
largest emitter after the transport sector.
The energy transition in the power sector entails sweeping changes in at least three areas. The 
most important one is deregulation. As mentioned earlier, the recently approved energy reform 
furnishes an opportunity to transform the sector by diversifying the sources of power generation, 
by favoring market entry for new private producers and by creating new investment opportunities 
for renewables. Effective implementation of different instruments such as the clean-energy 
certificates market will be vital to incentivize clean generation technologies. The second area of 
opportunity is the new Energy Transition Law (LTE) which is due to replace the LAERFTE (Law 
on the Use of Renewable Energies and Financing of Energy Transition) but still under discussion, 
and its mandates to generate 35% of electricity from clean energy by 2024 and 50% by 2050. 
[7] Given a current population of around 7.3 billion people, according to the UN Population Division, this will represent a 
23% increase in world population by 2035 compared to 2015.
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Confirmation of these targets will provide clarity for new investments in the sector. The third area 
of opportunity concerns electricity prices. In 2013, electricity subsidies accounted for 0.85% of GDP 
(INECC, 2014b). Electricity tariffs have risen sharply over recent years, with industrial customers 
bearing the brunt of the increases. Industrial customers pay electricity rates that are 70% higher 
than those in the U.S., which deals a heavy blow to the competitiveness of Mexico’s industry. 
Additionally, substantial government subsidies account for more than 60% of the cost of electricity 
for residential and agricultural customers. Gradually phasing out these subsidies in the years to 
come would increase the real costs, thus incentivizing energy efficiency and making renewable 
energy competitive relative to fossil fuels.
2.4.2. Oil and gas sectors
Mexico is one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of crude oil, with production totaling 
2.5 million barrels per day (MMbd) in 2013. However, domestic production has shown a declining 
trend due to the fact that 80% of the national production comes from mature fields that are 
currently in decline (SENER, 2014a). The marginal increase in production during the recent years is 
essentially due to unconventional oil, mainly deep-water oil.
In 2012, the sales revenues of the oil and gas sector accounted for 10.56% of GDP (calculation based 
on PEMEX, 2012 and INEGI, 2015a). Although the 2013 annual export earnings from crude were 
down by 8.8% on 2012 (SENER, 2014b), they still represented 26% of total exports and 3.8% of 
GDP. As such, Mexico remains an important producer of fossil fuels but it has lacked the capacity to 
process and refine its own oil products to meet the domestic demand.
Oil and gas production has steadily decreased over the 2006–2013 period after peaking in 2004 at 
3.4 MMbd (EIA, 2015). A more technically difficult oil extraction process involving higher costs has 
caused the country to shift from relatively cheap and abundant oil to exactly the opposite situation 
within a few years. If the recent trend continues, Mexico could soon become a net importer of oil 
products due to its decreasing domestic production and increasing demand for refined oil products.
In the context of Mexico’s energy reform, one of the key objectives is to step up the extraction of 
natural gas. This strategy includes investments in domestic production of natural gas, the expansion 
of pipeline infrastructure, the exploration of potential oil and shale gas reserves and the expansion 
of hydrocarbon production. Expectations are that Mexico’s oil production will increase from 
2.5 MMbd in 2013 to 3.4 MMbd in 2030 and that natural gas production will triple from 4.5 million 
cubic feet per day (MMcfd) in 2013 to 12 MMcfd in 2030. Refined oil products will remain stable, 
with production at 1.2 MMbd in 2013 and 1.4 MMbd in 2030. Finally, a decrease in the production 
of basic petrochemicals is expected to fall from 2.5 MMcfd to 0.8 MMcfd in 2030 (SENER, 2014b).
Regarding GHG emissions, a specific feature of the oil and gas sector is that although its energy 
consumption is not significantly high compared to other sectors, oil and gas extraction accounts for 
a relatively high amount of fugitive emissions (methane, CH
4
). Emissions from the oil and gas sector 
in 2013 totaled 52.5MtCO
2
,[8] representing 12% of total GHG emissions from energy consumption 
(INECC, 2014a).
[8] Emissions from energy consumption in the extraction process, not including fugitive emissions. 
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2.4.3. Industry sectors
Basic industries, such as cement, iron and steel, chemicals and chemical products, cellulose and 
paper, and glass, are key components of economic growth in Mexico. From 1994 and 2010, their 
average contribution to GDP was around 30%, including the manufacturing industry (González, 
2012). However, this share decreased from 2003 to 2013 due to a low average growth rate of 2.1% 
over this same period (INEGI, 2015a).
Industry’s economic growth has gone hand in hand with increasing pressure on the environment. 
As a highly energy-intensive sector, industry accounted for 32.6% of total energy consumption in 
2013 (BNE, 2013), which ranks it the second largest consumer just behind transport. From 2003 
to 2013, energy demand from industry rose by 32%, while CO
2
 emissions have increased steadily 
over recent years. Industry accounted for 105.37 MtCO
2
e of GHG emissions in 2013 (INECC, 
2014a). Even though the sector has improved its levels of energy efficiency in the face of growing 
international competition, its energy consumption continues to rise, particularly in the extractive 
industry, given that extraction and transformation of increasingly scarce raw materials require 
an increasing amount of energy. Furthermore, the industry sector’s productivity has stagnated in 
recent years: gross value added (GVA) has barely increased from 29.3% to 29.8% as a share of the 
gross production value (INEGI, 2015a).
The growing demand for energy has also driven emissions higher. GHG emissions increased by 13% 
from 2000 to 2010, that is, from 104.5 to 117.9 MtCO
2
e (INECC, 2013). According to INEGI (2015b), 
the cost associated with the depletion and exhaustion of natural resources was around 3.79% of the 
total environmental cost to the economy as a whole, or 1.7% of the industry sector’s GDP in 2012.
2.4.4. Transportation sector
Transport is the most energy-intensive sector in Mexico and accounted for 44.7% of the country’s 
total energy consumption in 2012. Of total transport consumption, the share of road transport 
represents 91.9%, air 5.3%, sea 1.43%, rail 1.16 % and electric-powered transport 0.17 %. In terms 
of fuel consumption, the figures show an undiversified matrix based on 97.7% of fossil fuels such 
as gasoline and diesel. All modes of transport are completely dependent on oil and the sector 
contributes 37.8 % of total GHG emissions from fossil fuel consumption (BNE, 2012).
Moreover, the transport sector plays a crucial role in competitiveness. It is a key determinant of a 
country’s efficiency and economic development. In this sense, it is important to distinguish between 
the movement of goods and passengers. Whereas the movement of goods falls with the scope 
of trip demand and therefore counts as an economic activity, the movement of passengers is 
considered as mobility and does not in itself represent an economic activity. This explains why the 
transport sector makes a small contribution to GDP, with 5% in 2014 (INEGI, 2015a), yet has a great 
impact on total GHG emissions.
Since 2002, the demand for fossil fuels in this sector has increased at a rate of 3.8 % per year and is 
expected to continue rising over the next two decades (SENER, 2014b). This huge increase is driven 
by the growth of the vehicle stock, which can in part be explained by constant real fuel prices, the 
supply of cheap import used vehicles and, in general, a high income elasticity that characterizes this 
sector. The motorization rate per 1,000 inhabitants is up from 179 in 2008 to 206 in 2013 (INECC, 
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2015). The total demand for vehicles in the country was around 1.9 million vehicles in 2013 (including 
new and imported used, light- and heavy-duty vehicles as well as motorcycles). With an income 
elasticity ranging from 0.72 to 0.86 depending on the vehicle category, it is expected that vehicle 
ownership could reach 328 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants by 2030 (INECC, 2015).
Finally, the policy of keeping real fuel prices constant over the last two decades has distorted the 
vehicle market not only in terms of stock but also energy efficiency. The new light-duty vehicle 
fleet has barely changed its fuel economy, with an annual rate of 2.6% over the period 2008–2012 
(Islas et al., 2012). Recent changes in fuel price policy together with the approved energy efficiency 
regulation for new light-duty vehicles (NOM163, published in 2013 for the period 2014–2016) will 
incentivize technological change as well as a change in the sales mix of passenger vehicles versus 
light trucks. Both measures will have a positive impact on the fuel economy of the fleet. During the 
period 2010–2014, regular gasoline and diesel prices increased approximately 38% in real terms 
(2010 Mexican pesos), reducing the implicit subsidy and sending the right price signal to consumers. 
However, having a tax or a subsidy depends on international prices and the recently approved 
Hydrocarbons Law (2014) states that prices will only adjust for inflation in the period 2015–2017, 
leaving it up to the Federal Government to control national prices in the case of high volatility in the 
international market. It is only from 2018 that prices will be set under market conditions but the law 
does not mention any other change in fiscal terms regarding a fuel tax. This means that price policies 
could still veer and adversely impact the fuel economy. If no new fuel economy regulation is put in 
place for the period 2017–2025 (as already launched in the USA), any lean gains that may have been 
recently acquired would quickly vanish.
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3  ThreeME for Mexico
3 1  Main characteristics of ThreeME
ThreeME (Multi-sector Macroeconomic Model for the Evaluation of Environmental and Energy 
policy) is a country-generic and open source model developed since 2008 by the ADEME (French 
Environment and Energy Management Agency), the OFCE (French Economic Observatory) and 
TNO (Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research).[9] Initially developed to support 
the energy/environment/climate debate in France, ThreeME has now been applied to other 
national contexts such as Mexico and Indonesia.
The model is specially designed to evaluate the medium- and long-term impact of environmental 
and energy policies at the macroeconomic and sector levels. To do so, ThreeME combines several 
important features:
•  Its sectoral disaggregation allows the effect of transferring activities from one sector 
to another to be analyzed, particularly in terms of employment, investment, energy 
consumption and trade balance.
•  The energy disaggregation allows analysis of the energy behavior of economic agents. 
Sectors can arbitrate between different energy investments: substitution between capital 
and energy when the relative energy price increases; substitution between energy sources. 
Consumers can substitute between energy sources, between types of transport or between 
goods.
•  ThreeME is a CGEM (Computable General Equilibrium Model). It therefore takes into 
account the interaction and feedback between supply and demand (see Figure 3). The 
demand (consumption, investment) defines the supply (production). In return, supply 
defines demand via the income generated by the production factors (labor, capital, etc.). 
Compared to bottom-up energy models such as MARKAL or LEAP, ThreeME goes beyond 
a simple description of the sectoral/technological dimension by linking these with the global 
economic system.
•  ThreeME is a neo-Keynesian model. Compared to standard Walrasian-type CGEM, prices do 
not instantaneously clear supply and demand. Instead, the model is dynamic and prices and 
quantities adjust slowly. This has the advantage of allowing for situations of disequilibrium 
[9] (OFCE/ADEME/TNO, 2013). A full description of ThreeME is provided on: www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/indic&prev/
modele.htm. 
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between supply and demand (in particular the presence of involuntary unemployment). 
This framework is better suited to policymaking purposes as it provides information on the 
transition phase of a particular policy (not only on the long term).
Being a neo-Keynesian CGE model, ThreeME takes into account:
•  general equilibrium effects: supply influences demand and vice versa,
•  direct and indirect effects of the energy transition: the direct effects are the impacts on the energy, 
building, transport sectors, whereas the indirect effects (or rebound effects) are the impacts 
on the rest of the economy (particularly the other sectors, the Government, households),
•  a double dividend (environmental and economic) is possible through improvement of the trade 
balance, reduction of fiscal distortion (e.g., reduction of taxes on labor and capital financed 
by a carbon tax) and the positive macroeconomic effects due to the increase in demand 
(positive multiplier).
Figure 3  Architecture of a CGEM
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ThreeME can be used to simulate the economic impact of various policies. Examples of scenario 
simulations related to energy and climate policies include:
•  a carbon tax,
•  a phasing-out of energy subsidies,
•  a tax credit in favor of energy renovation in the building sector,
•  subsidies in favor of green investments in buildings, automotive and public transport sectors
•  the impact of transitions in the energy sectors (such as the increased use of renewables).
3 2  Main characteristics of the Mexican version of ThreeME
The Mexican version of the ThreeME model follows a generic architecture also used in the French 
version. The choice of sectors is specific to Mexico and these are shown in Table 4. The model has 
24 commodities (including 3 energy sources: refined oil, gas and electricity) and 32 sectors with 
an explicit distinction between 11 energy sectors and 7 types of transport. The rationale behind 
this disaggregation is the energy intensity of sectors and the contribution of each sector to CO
2
 
emissions. National data sources have been used for the calibration (INEGI, 2012, 2013): supply 
and use[10] tables and input-output tables (262 Branches) and the institutional sector (household 
accounts and Government accounts).
Year 2008 is used as the base year since it corresponds to the most recent release regarding input-
output tables at the time this project began. Additional public sector data such as the financial 
situation of the Federal Government and social security come from the Mexican Ministry of Finance 
(SHCP[11]). Population projection comes from the National Council of Population (CONAPO[12]) and 
the 2008 level of CO
2
 emissions is calibrated using the National Inventory of Greenhouse Gases 
(INEGEI[13]) data. Finally, for the disaggregation of energy sectors, we use data from the Energy 
Information System (SIE-SENER[14]): more specifically, domestic gas sales and gas imports and final 
energy consumption by power technologies and sectors.
Table 3 provides some of Mexico’s key macroeconomic data for 2008. Energy subsidies represent 
97% of total subsidies and 2.2% of total GDP. Mexico’s crude oil exports represent 3.8% of GDP, 
and the country imports a large amount of refined oil and gas products: 2.6% of GDP. Tax on 
hydrocarbons is an important source of revenue for the Federal Government, representing 7.5% 
of GDP and 32% of its total revenue in 2008. Accounting for 415 million tons of CO
2
 from energy 
consumption, Mexico is the world’s 14th largest emitter and the biggest source of CO
2 
emissions in 
Latin America. Moreover, Mexico is ranked 100th in terms of its level of emissions per capita.[15]
[10] Set of matrices that describe the magnitude of the inter-industrial flows depending on the production levels of each 
economic sector (INEGI, 2012), (INEGI, 2013) 
[11] http://www.shcp.gob.mx/POLITICAFINANCIERA/FINANZASPUBLICAS/Estadisticas_Oportunas_Finanzas_
Publicas/Informacion_mensual/Paginas/ingresos_gasto_financiamiento.aspx
[12] Consejo Nacional de Población, http://www.conapo.gob.mx/
[13] (INEGEI, 2013) http://www.inecc.gob.mx/descargas/cclimatico/inf_inegei_public_2010.pdf
[14] http://sie.energia.gob.mx/
[15] http://www.eia.gov/
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Table 3  Key macroeconomic data for Mexico in 2008 (base year) 
Features 2008
Public Deficit, %GDP 1.7%
Import of refined oil and gas product 
% GDP
2.6%
Debt, %GDP 31%
Export of refined oil and gas product  
% GDP
0.6%
Energy Subsidies  
(electricity and oil), %Total subsidies
97%
Export of crude oil  
% GDP
3.8%
Energy Subsidies  
(electricity and oil), % GDP
2.2% Emissions of CO
2
 from energy uses MtCO
2
415
Tax on Hydrocarbon  
(Derechos a los hidrocarburos), % GDP 
7.5% Household emissions, % 31%
Trade Balance, %GDP -2.7% Sector emissions, % 69%
Source: INEGI, 2012
Table 4  Sectoral disaggregation of ThreeME for Mexico
N° Sectors Production% N° Sectors
Production
%
1 Agriculture, livestock and fishing 2.9% 17 Transport via pipeline 0.1%
2 Forestry 0.1% 18 Other transports 0.6%
3 Mining 1.3% 19 Business services 33.8%
4
Manufacture of food, beverages 
and snuff
7.0% 20 Public services 6.7%
5
Manufacture of articles of paper  
and paperboard
0.9% 21 Extraction of oil 4.7%
6 Manufacture of chemicals 2.5% 22
Manufacture of refined petroleum 
products
3.7%
7
Manufacture of cement  
and concrete
0.4% 23 Manufacture and distribution of gas 1.7%
8 Manufacture of steel 0.8% 24 Hydraulic 0.3%
9
Manufacture of motor vehicles  
and trucks
2.0% 25 Geothermal 0.1%
10 Other industries 15.1% 26 Wind 0.0%
11 Construction of buildings 9.1% 27 Solar 0.0%
12 Air transport 0.5% 28 Biomass 0.0%
13 Rail transport 0.1% 29 Nuclear 0.1%
14 Water transport 0.1% 30 Coal-based 0.2%
15 Freight transport by road 2.4% 31 Oil-based 0.4%
16 Passenger transport by road 1.6% 32 Gas-based 0.9%
Source: INEGI, 2012
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The electricity sector is disaggregated into 9 technologies: hydro, geothermal, wind, solar, biomass, 
nuclear, coal-based, oil-based and gas-based. However, the development of each of these 
technologies is determined exogenously. This assumption is realistic for the electricity production 
sector, since it is the Government that delivers authorizations for installing power plants. Hence, 
the investment choices for the electricity technology sectors do not obey the same market rules 
as the other economic activities. They are almost entirely determined by public policy (something 
that is expected to change in the coming years with full implementation of the energy reform). 
The parametrization of the electricity mix in the base year uses data from the Energy Information 
System. For each technology, the share of labor, capital, intermediary consumption and fuel 
consumption in the production cost have been parametrized using data from the Ministry of 
Energy (SENER, 2014a).
In Mexico, anthropogenic CO
2
 emissions represent about 65% of total greenhouse gas emissions.[16] 
They come mainly from the combustion of fossil fuels (more than 80% of total CO
2
 emissions), 
industrial processes, land-use change and forestry. The modeling of the demand for fossil fuels 
is detailed by type of economic agent and by type of fossil energy (oil, coal or gas). This allows 
for a precise estimation of the variation in domestic CO
2
 emissions. In the Mexican version of 
ThreeME, we consider only CO
2
 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels. The calculation of 
emission levels is obtained by multiplying the fossil energy demand by the corresponding emission 
coefficient. These coefficients are specific to each economic actor, each sector and each energy 
source depending on their carbon intensity. CO
2
 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels by 
sector and households are proportional to the quantity of energy consumed.
Technological innovations are a key factor in reducing the impact of economic activity on the 
environment since they enable a reduction of emissions per unit of GDP. Improvements in energy 
efficiency mitigate the impact of economic growth on climate change, although the final impact 
of energy efficiency on energy use and CO
2
 emissions is uncertain due to the “rebound effect”.[17] 
In the model there are two types of energy efficiency that have impacts on the results. The first 
is exogenous, given the observed historical trends in Mexico in the production and consumption 
sectors, as explained in the next section. The second type of energy efficiency is endogenous since 
it depends on the energy prices in the model. We assume that higher energy prices, which may be 
the result of environmental policy, stimulate energy efficiency in economic sectors through a higher 
elasticity between capital and energy.
3.2.1. Observed trends of energy efficiency in Mexico
Energy efficiency plays a key role in the model, since it has relevant effects on energy intensity 
by sector. According to SENER (2011), energy efficiency in the industry sector has evolved over 
time, depending on the sub-sector. The highest energy-intensive sector is manufacturing, which in 
2009 accounted for 9.8 megajoules (Mj) per 2003 US dollar produced; however, energy intensity 
[16] See INEGEI, 2013, p.28.
[17] In this report, we focus on the interpretation of the rebound effect at the macroeconomic level, which includes direct 
and indirect effects. The macroeconomic rebound effect implies that the aggregate energy saving from climate 
change measures might be offset by an associated increase in energy demand and therefore in CO
2
 emissions, due to 
the boost in economic activity brought about by these same measures (Barker, Ekins & Foxon, 2007).
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was reduced by 0.8% per year between 1993 and 2009. Within the manufacturing sub-sector, the 
ferrous and nonferrous minerals, chemical products and cellulose and paper industries have shown 
an energy intensity growth rate of -1.9, 0.4, -4.9 and -2.4% respectively.
The energy efficiency path of the manufacturing sector from 1993 to 2009 is reported in Figure 4. 
It shows a decreasing trajectory from 1993 to 2009. According to Enerdata (2011), industrial energy 
intensity fell by 2% per year; however, as from 2000 it decreased less rapidly, at an annual 0.5%. 
The largest energy efficiency improvements were achieved in steel production (2.2% per year on 
average from 1990 to 2008), whilst the chemical industry saw a rapid drop in its energy intensity of 
around 7% per year as from the year 2000.
In sum, energy intensity varies differently across sectors. If we consider energy intensity to be an 
adequate indicator of energy efficiency, and taking account the above discussion, a 1% increase per 
year for the production sector would seem to be a reasonable assumption for energy efficiency. 
Future modeling efforts will have to take into account different efficiencies that vary across sectors.
In the residential and commercial sectors, energy efficiency will also be a key determinant of energy 
intensity. Most of the energy gains in the upcoming years will be due to lighting and water-heating 
improvements. In the case of water-heating, 12.9 Mbd of liquefied petroleum (LP) gas were saved 
through improved energy efficiency for water heaters (67.9%), stoves (28.7%) and microwaves 
(3.4%). For water-heating, it is expected that efficiency gains will be 0.6% of the average annual 
efficiency rate for water heaters from 2013 to 2027 (SENER 2013a). Figure 5 shows the trend of 
water-heater efficiency. As in the case of industry, the model will assume a 0.5% annual increase 
in efficiency for the residential sector. These efficiency gains will mainly stem from the increased 
efficiency of water heaters and other cooking appliances using gas.
Table 5  Energy intensity by industry and primary sector
Sector Indicator 1993 2009
Growth rate per year 
1993-2009
Manufacturing (total)
Energy intensity (MJ/GDP) 11.2 9.8 -0.8%
Energy consumption share (%) 90.8 88.4 -0.2%
Basic metals
Energy intensity (MJ/GDP) 20.5 14.9 -1.9%
Energy consumption share (%) 9.2 7.7 -1.1%
Non-Ferrous minerals
Energy intensity (MJ/GDP) 12.4 13.2 0.4%
Energy consumption share (%) 7.9 9 0.8%
Chemical products
Energy intensity (MJ/GDP) 18 8 -4.9%
Energy consumption share (%) 17.7 8.5 -4.5%
Cellulose and paper
Energy intensity (MJ/GDP) 15.2 10.4 -2.4%
Energy consumption share (%) 2.6 2.6 -0.1%
Source: SENER, 2011.
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Figure 4  Energy intensity of the manufacturing sector
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Figure 5  Water heater efficiency (%) 2012–2027
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028
New water heaters Existing water heaters
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
90
Source: SENER, 2013a.

31
4  Simulation results
As indicated in the previous descriptions of energy sector, reducing CO
2
 emissions will mean 
implementing policies and measures to support green investments in both the short and long run. 
A carbon tax accompanied by appropriate compensation mechanisms appears to be one way of 
reconciling environmental and economic goals. This would not only attract funds for low-carbon 
investments, but also boost public and private investments as well as employment.
The purpose of the carbon tax is to boost green activity in order to steer the Mexican economy 
onto the track of a real reduction in carbon emissions and implement a cost-effective way of 
achieving the ambitious national mitigation commitment set out in the Climate Change Law.[18] This 
aims at a 30% decrease in emissions with respect to the baseline by 2020, and a 50% reduction by 
2050 compared to the year 2000. A progressive carbon price is one of the tools designed to ensure 
that carbon emissions reduction actually happens.
Recent experience has shown that carbon pricing is likely to encounter serious opposition. A high 
carbon price would have negative effects that need to be taken into consideration, mainly through 
three channels (OFCE/ECLM/IMK, 2015):
1.  Loss of consumption by high carbon emitters among households. High carbon emitters may 
be vulnerable households with little possibility of substitution given that energy is a primary 
good and the choices made by households rule out rapid adaptation to a large shift in relative 
prices.
2.  The same effect occurs for producers that cannot rapidly shift investments (without 
depreciating of a large amount of capital) related to their production function in the event 
of a change in relative prices. A high carbon price would have a strong negative impact on 
their balance sheet or their capacity to run their business. The irreversibility of investment (as 
in the case of households) is the cause of the loss incurred.
3.  Emissions reduction at the global level may not even be achieved because of the free-rider 
problem:
a.  A general loss of competitiveness in the short term generated by a higher cost of energy 
compared to the cost of energy in other parts of the world where such a carbon price 
would not be applied.
[18] See LGCC, 2012.
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b.  A reduced energy demand from those countries that have applied carbon pricing may 
lead to a decrease of global energy prices, which ultimately triggers higher energy demand 
elsewhere. This is tied to the rebound effect.
c.  A carbon leakage – given that carbon-emitting industrial processes may be located in 
places where prices and taxes are lower – could result in an overall increase of global 
carbon emissions and job destruction in countries that implement carbon pricing.
Positive effects from carbon pricing policies are often experienced when a comprehensive policy 
package, including decreases in other taxes, is implemented to help the transition.[19] A full carbon 
price recycling scheme would thus be part of the policy package, making the pricing of carbon 
more attractive. Redistribution of the carbon tax revenue is thus a means of offsetting the stepwise 
increase in carbon prices. As this tax can target specific individuals or sectors, it allows for different 
carbon pricing for different economic agents.
Carbon tax trend
The idea of a carbon tax comes from the theoretical concept that the English economist Arthur Pigou 
developed in order to address market failures. It involves levying a tax on goods that impose spillover 
costs on society that are not borne by the source of the externality. Adding a tax thus allows the social 
cost to be reflected in a cost-effective way, through private markets. Climate change has been identi-
fied as a negative externality for society as it creates a less favorable environment and is directly linked 
to GHG emissions generated by our fossil fuel consumption. There is a broad consensus on taxing 
carbon dioxide as a way of reducing GHG emissions, although a debate persists on its socially optimal 
price. The externality is quite difficult to clearly identify and estimate given that, despite strong scien-
tific evidence on the nature of the phenomenon, there is still uncertainty on its magnitude.
For the purpose of pricing carbon, some countries have implemented empirical experiments either 
unilaterally or regionally and there is some evidence of a relatively high carbon price. For instance, the 
Swedish carbon tax is up to US$168/tCO
2
 and the Tokyo Cap-and-Trade carbon price reaches US$95/
tCO
2
. The majority of prices in existing systems lie below US$35/tCO
2
. A recent IMF study (Parry et al., 
2014) calculates what the CO
2
 emissions price should be for the top twenty emitting countries, based 
solely on the domestic co-benefits gained from reducing negative externalities (other than climate 
change) such as local pollution, health damages and traffic congestion. The authors found that the 
average nationally efficient price is US$57.5/tCO
2
. In the Deep Decarbonization report (Sachs et al., 
2014), the authors propose, at least for France, a carbon price trajectory – initially formulated by the 
Quinet commission (Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, 2009) and compatible with the objectives of 75% 
emissions reduction by 2050 – starting at USD2008 36/tCO
2
 in 2010, USD2008 63/tCO
2
 in 2020 and 
USD2008 112/tCO
2
 in 2030.
[19] See World Bank, 2014.
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Compensation is thus justified as it has a positive impact on the economy in the short term and 
makes carbon pricing politically acceptable and less costly for economic agents. It may also bolster 
the ambition to engage the economy on a path towards lower carbon emissions and heighten the 
chances of success.
The following section presents the results of the different scenarios obtained using the Mexican 
version of the ThreeME model. We propose that its negative effects be addressed through a 
compensation scheme. These scenarios include the phasing-out of energy subsidies and the 
implementation of carbon tax with different schemes of fiscal revenue recycling. They also take 
account of the different electricity mixes[20] envisaged by 2050. The level of the carbon tax has been 
chosen so as to comply with the target of the “IDEAL scenario” designed by the National Institute of 
Ecology and Climate Change (INECC) for energy-related GHG emissions. It considers a reduction of 
40% by 2030 compared to the baseline and a reduction of 50% by 2050 compared to the year 2000.
4 1  Baseline scenario
The baseline (reference or business-as-usual [BAU]) scenario is the path predicted by the model 
when all exogenous variables follow their “business-as-usual” trend and is meant to be a conservative 
vision of the future rather than a real forecast. It is the virtual scenario predicted by the model for 
a given trajectory of the exogenous variables. Although it excludes cyclical fluctuations, the idea 
is to reflect as far as possible the expected changes regarding key exogenous variables such as 
population, productivity gains, tax rates, elasticities and external demand. By definition, the baseline 
scenario always excludes the impact of any policy being studied since this can be seen as a shock 
compared to the baseline scenario and is simulated as an alternative scenario (see Section 4.2).
Although the impact of a new policy is measured as a difference from the baseline expressed as a 
percentage, the choice of the baseline may affect the results of the simulated scenario. It is therefore 
important to define a coherent vision of the future, which may prove to be a difficult task in terms 
of calibration. To achieve the construction of a realistic baseline scenario, we focus on obtaining 
projections for a few key macroeconomic variables, such as real gross domestic product (GDP), 
population, the evolution of labor productivity and the evolution of international energy prices.
GDP projections for the Mexican economy to 2030 are drawn from a study that is part of the 
Facilitating Implementation and Readiness for Mitigation (FIRM) project (INECCb) funded by the 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French Agency for Development (AFD) and implemented 
through the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in partnership with UNEP DTU and 
INECC. The overall goal of this project was to improve Mexico’s GHG emissions baseline. In Mexico, 
as in any other industrialized economy, economic growth and energy commodity prices are key 
drivers of greenhouse gas emissions. Estimates of likely developments in gross domestic product 
and fuel prices are major components of quantitative greenhouse gas emission scenarios used for 
planning purposes. Understanding the uncertainty associated with these estimates makes it possible 
to assess the uncertainty of the corresponding scenarios and, thereby, supports more robust 
[20] Defined as the share of the different technologies producing electricity.
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planning. The project used the Cooke[21] method to quantify the uncertainty around economic 
growth rates and energy commodity prices, to support the Government of Mexico’s revision of its 
greenhouse gas emission scenarios.
Among the methods used to estimate uncertainty, behavioral and mathematical approaches are 
available to elicit and aggregate individual expert opinions. Behavioral methods involve having experts 
interact in order to reach agreement on information of relevance regarding their assessments of 
the variables of interest. In contrast, mathematical methods construct a “combined” probability 
distribution per variable by applying procedures or analytical models that operate on the individual 
assessments produced by each expert. For this project, a mathematical approach was preferred 
as the outcome of group interactions in behavioral approaches is often a “false consensus” that 
simply reflects the position of the dominant expert or experts in the group. More specifically, the 
project used the so-called Cooke method because it provides a more comprehensive treatment of 
conditionalization and dependence.
The final outcomes of this exercise in terms of economic growth showed a range of GDP growth 
rates for each one of three scenarios (high, medium and low) for the 2014–2020 and 2021–2030 
periods, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6   Range of GDP growth rate (%) for three scenarios (‘A’ high, ‘B’ medium 
and ‘C’ low) for two periods : 2014–2020 (referred to as ‘14-20’)  
and 2021–2030 (referred to as ‘21-30’)
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1.80 3.37
3.82
4.09
3.202.441.26
5.904.853.16
4.493.852.81
3.692.711.57
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
4.55 5.77
B 14-20
C 14-20
A 21-30
B 21-30
C 21-30
Source: Mexico’s FIRM Project (INECC, 2014b).
[21] More information about the Cooke method can be found in: “The ‘Cooke Method’: A Route to More Reliable Expert 
Advice”: www.rff.org/Documents/Features/294-295%20Opinion%20-%20Aspinall%20pr.pdf
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For the purposes of this work it was decided to use the low scenario for both periods. It is worth, 
mentioning that this low scenario assumes that important macroeconomic variables for the 
Mexican economy maintain an observed historical trend: from 3.0 to 3.5 for the Mexican interest 
rate; from 5.0 to 5.4 for unemployment; from 3.0 to 3.5 for the inflation rate and; from 2.8 to 3.3 for 
the US GDP rate of growth.
Population data is collected from CONAPO’s demographic projections (2010–2050). The projection 
for labor productivity is derived from the two previously mentioned series and is calculated as the 
GDP per capita. Assumptions on population and productivity are not sufficient for the simulation 
to reproduce the targeted GDP because of the dynamic of the model and because the demand 
side should also be coherent with this target. Using a solver, the trends of public expenditure and 
external demand were calibrated so as to reproduce our GDP target. This way, the evolution of 
the baseline GDP follows its long-term determinant and grows at a rate equal to the sum of the 
population and labor productivity growth rates (See Figure 7).
Regarding the international oil and gas prices, we use the projection of the US Energy Information 
Administration.[22] Oil and gas prices increase respectively by 3.7% and 4.7% per year from 2015 to 
2050 (see Figure 8). The consumer price (derived endogenously) increases by 2.9% per year.
Figure 7  Contribution to GDP
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[22]  http://www.eia.gov/
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Figure 8  Consumer, oil and gas prices 
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The baseline scenario is also characterized by some key underlying hypotheses summarized below:
•  Energy efficiency increases exogenously by 1% on average per year for production sectors 
and 0.5% for households (see Section 3.2.1). No exogenous trend for the price of energy 
technology was considered.
•  The rate of subsidies on the volume of energy consumed is assumed constant whereas the 
tax rates on energy quantities increase at the same rhythm as inflation.
•  Conservative elasticities of substitution have been used in the model, which assumes a 
three-level production structure (see Figure 9). The level of elasticity used in each level 
is presented in Table 6. The first level assumes a technology with four production factors 
(capital, labor, energy and material), using a Variable Output Elasticities Cobb-Douglas 
function. This function is a generalization of the constant elasticity of substitution 
function that allows the integration of different values of elasticity between each couple 
of production factors (OFCE/ADEME/TNO, 2013). The first level has a fifth element: the 
transport and commercial margins. These cannot be considered as production factors 
strictly speaking since they intervene downstream of the production process. They are 
thus not substitutable with the production factors. But they are closely related to the 
level of production since, once a good has been processed, it has to be transported 
and commercialized. At the second level, the investment, energy, material and margin 
aggregates are further decomposed. Elasticities of substitution between energies (oil-coal 
refining, gas and electricity) are assumed equal to 0.6. The same value is assumed for the 
transport margin, whereas there is no substitution possible between material goods and 
between investment goods. We consider that the substitution between some modes 
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of transport is not possible, as for example between pipelines and the other types of 
transport and between trucking and passenger transport. At the third level, the demand 
for each factor is either imported or produced domestically for each type of use (such as 
intermediary consumption, investment, final consumption and public investment). In all 
cases, we assume an Armington elasticity of substitution of 0.8.
•  Endogenous energy efficiency is taken into account by assuming that the elasticity between 
capital and energy depends on their relative prices: an increase of the energy price relative to 
the price of capital leads to a higher level of elasticity of substitution. The elasticity between 
the elasticity of substitution and relative prices is 1.5. In addition, we assume that this effect is 
irreversible so that a decrease of the price of energy relative to the price of capital does not 
lead to a decrease of the elasticity of substitution. In the baseline scenario, these elasticities 
are relatively stable since the relative price between capital and energy is quite stable. This is 
not the case in the policy scenarios that include a carbon tax.
All the hypotheses listed above lead to total CO
2
 emissions from energy uses of 715 million tons 
by 2050. The model considers two main emitting segments in the economy: households and 
productive sectors. These segments contribute 283 (40%) and 432 (60%) million tons respectively 
(see Figure 10). Households include transport for domestic use only (private light-duty fleet) and 
residential emissions. In the productive sectors, electric power, transport for commercial services 
and industry represent respectively 13%, 17% and 17% of the total emissions.
Figure 9  Production structure
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Figure 10  CO
2 
emissions from energy consumption (in millions of tons)
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Table 6  Value of the elasticity of substitution
Description Value
Level 1: KLEM Elasticity
Between Capital and labor in all sectors
Between Capital and energy23
Between Labor and energy in non-energy sectors
Between Labor and energy in energy sectors
Between Capital and materials, Labor and materials and Energy and materials in all sectors
0.5
0.6
0.3
0
0
Level 2
Between energy intermediate input in all sectors
Between transport margins
Between investment goods and between material goods 
0.6
0.6
0
Level 3
Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 0.8
Between final consumption goods 1
Elasticity of exports 0.6
[23] This elasticity is endogenous; it depends on their relative price. The value of 0.6 corresponds to the calibration for the 
base year 2008.
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4.1.1. Soft link with POLES for the power sector
INECC, in cooperation with the Danish Energy Agency and ENERDATA, used the POLES[24] model 
in order to establish the baseline generation of electricity as well as the desired electricity matrix 
to set the GHG mitigation goal for 2050. The outputs from this project were useful in that they 
provided a more detailed disaggregation at the technological level, due to the fact that the model 
has a strong engineering background. As input, the ThreeME model needed the percentages by 
generation technology per year but, as this is an exogenous variable, it was necessary to have 
a solid foundation to strengthen the projection of technologies given the time horizon of the 
projection.
The most important characteristics for the electricity sector modeling were:
•  Same macroeconomic variables taken into account in ThreeME: GDP growth and population,
•  Fuel efficiencies and merit order calibrated on historical data,
•  Simulation of future capacity development by technology, including endogenous technology 
learning (“learning-by-searching”, “learning-by-doing”),[25]
•  Different limitations on the development of renewables: geographical constraints and 
technical limitations,
•  Power production is differentiated for: “must-run” technologies (technologies with a small 
or negligible variable cost), and “merit-order” technologies (technologies with a high variable 
production cost).
Assumptions for the development of the baseline:
•  For the 2013–2027 period, incorporation of the capacities and technology mix from the 
SENER[26] forecast (an attempt was made to match the expected generation). Due to inherent 
difficulties in reconciling capacities and generation because of differences in technology 
costs, efficiencies and merit order, the different scenarios consider identical technology 
penetration rates. For the 2028–2050 period, the model runs by itself, taking into account all 
the characteristics mentioned above.
•  There is substitution between gas and oil technologies due to higher oil prices projected up 
to 2030. Given Mexico’s characteristics, this means the phase-out of fuel oil combustion.
•  There is a substantial penetration of renewables between 2030 and 2050. It is important to 
highlight that the share of clean energy in the electricity matrix is 50% by 2050. Although 
this might appear to be a mitigation scenario, POLES forecasts that renewable energy will be 
competitive against fossil fuels, where the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) in terms of 
US$/kWh becomes equivalent for both sources in the year 2030. This is due mainly to trends 
[24] More information on the POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) model can be found at:
 http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/solutions/energy-models/poles-model.php
[25] IEA World Energy Outlook database available at:
 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weomodel/investmentcosts/
[26] Ministry of Energy, Prospective of the electricity sector 2013-2027.
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of: 1) higher fossil fuel prices; 2) decrease of technological costs and; 3) rates of learning-by-
doing for renewables (for example, for solar power plants, hybrid CSP/PV[27] plants is 10%; 
distributed photovoltaics 18% and onshore wind 5%).
4 2 Alternative scenarios
To test the impact of specific policies, we simulate alternative scenarios that we can compare to 
the baseline scenario. The policies considered are shown in Table 7. We consider three policies. The 
first involves the implementation of a carbon tax (PCO2TAX). The second is the removal of energy 
subsidies (PSUB), and the third is the redistribution of revenues generated by the carbon tax and the 
removal of energy subsidies (PREDIS).
The impact of the above-described policies can be explored relative to various targets. Table 8 
provides a summary of the targets we consider. We define two types of targets. The first one 
refers to the level of CO
2
 emissions from energy consumption (TCO
2
). The second type of target 
concerns gradual changes in the electricity generation matrix for the period of analysis, which means 
changes in the share of the different technologies producing electricity (TMIX). The objective of 
this exercise is to conduct a sensitivity analysis of two different scenarios, and to be able to look at 
the impacts in terms of carbon tax, emissions reduction and macroeconomic variables, to highlight 
the importance of a clean electricity matrix. For this exercise, the scenarios considered are:
•  TMIX-RENEW. This target portrays a major potential for renewables. By 2050, 82% of the 
mix is from clean energy. ThreeME assumes the same scenario as the clean energy scenario 
undertaken by POLES.
–  The POLES scenario sets out a potential path that allows Mexico to align with a 2°C global 
effort. This means that all the assumptions in POLES are aligned with a world that is also 
[27]  CPS denotes concentrated solar power, and PV photovoltaic.
Figure 11  Baseline for the electricity matrix
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pursuing policies to align with this target. This assumption impacts all the variables involved, 
especially fossil fuel prices and technology costs for renewables. It complies with the target 
set by the LAERFTE to have 35% of power generation based on clean energy by 2024.
–  Clean power, including wind, solar, biomass and nuclear, plays a very significant role in 
decarbonizing Mexico’s power sector. Solar power costs are currently higher than 
onshore wind, but falling quickly.
–  Fossil fuel technologies are still needed to provide both baseload and peak power 
but, given the time horizon, technologies such as carbon capture and storage may be 
considered as able to fill this gap.
–  The 82% penetration of clean energy in the matrix indicates that the electricity sector has 
much greater potential than other sectors, thus offsetting the lack of emissions reduction 
or the higher costs of undertaking it. It is important to point out that this scenario involves 
about 200 additional terawatt hours (TWh) compared to the baseline scenario in 2050. 
This shows an effect where all the other energy sectors in the economy are switching to 
electricity. This has a double benefit: other energy sectors switch to electricity leaving 
behind other alternative sources of energy such as fossil-fuel-based thermal energy and 
they switch to a low-emission electricity matrix.
Table 7  Policies
PCO2TAX Implementation of a carbon tax 
PSUB Removal of energy subsidies
● All energy subsidies are phased out within 10 years (by 2024)
PREDIS Redistribution of all revenues from carbon tax collection and from the removal of energy subsidies
●  Revenues from the removal of energy subsidies are redistributed by reducing income tax for 
households.
●  Revenues from the carbon tax are redistributed by reducing income tax for households and payroll 
tax for the productive sectors. The carbon tax paid by households is fully reimbursed to them. The 
carbon tax paid by productive sectors is fully reimbursed to them through a reduction of the average 
payroll tax rate. This means that high (resp. low) energy-intensive sectors receive less (resp. more) than 
their contribution to the tax.
Table 8  Targets for the electricity mix and the level of CO
2
 emissions
TCO
2
CO
2
 emissions target for emissions from energy consumption, INECC’s “IDEAL scenario”: a reduction of 
emissions from energy uses of 55 million tCO
2
28 by 2018, by -40% in 2030 compared to the baseline, and -50% 
compared the 2000 level by 205029 (175 million tCO
2
 of emissions).
TMIX ●  TMIX-RENEW: 35% from clean energy by 2024 and a renewable-intensive electricity mix where 82% 
of the mix is from clean energy by 2050 given the carbon tax imposed to meet the target of 2000 levels 
by 2050.
●  TMIX-FOSSIL: Fossil-intensive electricity mix, that is to say, 74% of the mix is natural gas and 5% coal 
by 2050 
[28] This is estimated from the GHG emission target (83 MtCO
2
) stated in the Special Programme on Climate Change 
2014–2018 (PECC, 2014). Emissions from energy uses correspond to about 66% of total GHG emissions in 2018.
[29] LGCC, 2012.
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Figure 12  Electricity matrix with carbon tax
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•  TMIX-FOSSIL. 79% based on fossil fuels: 74% of the mix is from natural gas and 5% from 
coal by 2050.
In order to perform the sensitivity analysis, a scenario representing an energy matrix based on 
fossil fuels was developed, so that a wide range of possible impacts could be quantified. However, 
this scenario could not be seen as economically feasible before 2050, at least given the high cost 
forecasted for fossil resources. According to POLES, and assuming this trend, more renewable 
energy penetration is possible in the coming years; nonetheless, it was considered important to show 
the impacts of continuing with a fossil fuel investment scheme. While Mexico has a climate change 
law that specifies goals for the power sector, it is also concurrently promoting a major penetration 
of natural gas. This could delay the proposed transition or make it more expensive in the future, as 
the country is investing heavily in infrastructure that will support the current approach, at least for 
the next 20 years.
In this scenario, the share of natural gas in the energy matrix is 74%. The policy for phasing out fuel 
oil is retained, since historical data show that it has been decreasing over time (3.4% annual average 
since 2004 (SENER, 2014b)). And over the next fifteen years it does not appear to be economically 
feasible given the natural gas prices and efficiency. As for coal, the CFE plans to gradually reduce use 
of this at an annual average rate of 0.7%, but it remains an option considering that the plants using it 
as a primary energy source constitute a mature technology. Furthermore, coal is the primary energy 
source with the largest global reserves and its price has been less volatile compared to other fuels 
(SENER, 2014b).
The evolution of the electricity mix is therefore defined exogenously and is not sensitive to the 
relative prices between energy technologies in ThreeME. This assumption would be strong in a 
fully deregulated and decentralized electricity market. However, Mexico has only recently begun to 
deregulate its market, so it is most likely that decisions relating to electricity production will still be 
largely dominated by the state power company, CFE.
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Figure 13  Electricity matrix based on fossil fuels
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Table 9  Alternative scenarios simulated
Scenarios Policies Target mix
Target CO
2
 
emissions
S1  Fiscal policy without redistribution
●  S1A. Phasing-out of energy subsidies
●  S1B. Phasing-out of energy subsidies and 
implementation of a carbon tax
PSUB
PSUB + PCO2TAX
TMIX-RENEW
TMIX-RENEW TCO
2
S2  Fiscal policy with redistribution
●  Phasing-out of energy subsidies and 
implementation of a carbon tax
PSUB + PCO2TAX (S1)+ PREDIS TMIX-RENEW
S3  Changing the electricity mix  
(and fiscal policy with redistribution)
●  S3. Fossil-intensive electricity mix
PSUB + PCO2TAX (S1) + PREDIS TMIX-FOSSIL
The alternative scenarios simulated are constructed by combining the different policies and 
targets (Table 9). We define three groups of scenarios. The first one concerns fiscal policy without 
redistribution. This corresponds to increased taxation of fossil energy by phasing out energy 
subsidies (S1A) and the implementation of a carbon tax (S1B). Scenario S2 tests the impact of 
accompanying measures that are meant to reduce the negative economic impacts of the increase 
in energy taxation. Scenario S3 tests in addition the effect of changing the electricity mix.
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4 3  Macroeconomic results
Except when indicated otherwise, all results are reported as a difference from the baseline expressed 
as a percentage. The main macroeconomic results are shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15. The two 
fiscal policy scenarios without redistribution (S1A and S1B) have similar effects since they both 
increase the price of energy. However, they show two main differences. The first relates to the tax 
base of the fiscal instrument. Whereas the carbon tax is based exclusively on fossil energy, 16% of 
energy subsidies are spent on electricity. Even if the share of fossil energy in electricity production 
drops from 46% to 18% in these scenarios, a large part of the subsidy for electricity can be viewed 
as a fossil energy subsidy. The second and main difference between S1A and S1B concerns the order 
of magnitude of the shock: the carbon tax (S1B) leads to a stronger increase in energy prices, which 
amplifies the phasing-out of energy subsidies (S1A). Whereas the GDP decreases marginally in S1A 
until 2025, it drops by more than 4% after 2040 in S1B. The positive effect in S1A after 2025 is 
possible thanks to the high penetration of renewable energies in the electricity mix. In much the 
same way, the electricity mix limits the negative effect of GDP between 2025 and 2040 in S2 (see 
Figure 14.A). The level of the carbon tax has been chosen such that we reach a target of 353 and 
175 million tons of CO
2
 in 2030 and in 2050 respectively (see TCO
2
 in Table 8). This requires a 
carbon tax at MX$20151,500 (US$100) in 2030 and MX$201510,500 (US$700) in 2050 (see Figure 16D). 
Compared to the baseline scenario, this corresponds to a 40% decrease in CO
2 
emissions from 
energy consumption by 2030 and 75% by 2050 (see Figure 15.D).
Figure 14  GDP, Consumption, Export and Investment 
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The significant GDP decrease in S1B stems from the recessionary shock caused by the implementation 
of the carbon tax. The carbon tax increases the energy price by more than 300% by 2050 (see 
Figure 15.C), which results in higher overall prices. The increase of the consumer price by nearly 
25% (see Figure 15.B) has a negative impact on consumption, which drops by 10% (see Figure 14.B). 
Since we assume that the rest of the world does not follow a similar policy, the Mexican economy 
suffers from a loss of competitiveness due to higher production costs and thus higher prices. This 
leads to an 8% decrease in exports after 2040 (see Figure 14.C). As a consequence of these negative 
multiplier effects, the recessionary trend is reinforced by a decline in investment, down by 4% by 
2040 (see Figure 14.D). Noticeably different from consumption, investment starts to increase from 
2030 to 2035 (see Figure 14.B&D) because of the substitution from energy to capital. However, this 
substitution effect is too weak to offset the recessionary effect.
As expected, the GDP decrease in S1B leads to a decrease in employment, which falls by more than 
4% by 2040 (see Figure 15.A). This limits the progression of wages and explains why inflation tends 
to stabilize at the end of the period. It also explains why the consumption price is lower than in 
S2, where GDP increases (see Figure 15.B), whereas the price of energy continues to rise sharply in 
both cases (see Figure 15.C). Because of the substitution effects, CO
2 
emissions decrease by more 
than 75% by 2050 (see Figure 15.D). But this environmental dividend comes about at the cost of a 
recession, which makes this policy difficult to accept politically, at least in the short run.
Figure 15  Employment, Consumption price, Energy price and CO
2
 emissions
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By contrast, the implementation of the carbon tax with the tax revenue being fully redistributed 
(by reducing income tax for households and the payroll taxes for productive sectors) as in S2 
indicates a way of reconciling environmental and economic objectives: the effect on GDP is 
certainly positive (see Figure 14.A), whereas the decrease in emissions is only a slightly lower than in 
S1B (see Figure 15.D).
Several reasons can explain why redistribution leads to a positive effect on GDP. First, the average 
real revenue remains more or less stable since the tax revenue is given back to households.[30] 
Second, redistribution also limits the increase of production costs especially for labor-intensive 
industries. By penalizing energy-intensive sectors – which also happen to be less labor-intensive (see 
the sector results of Section 4.4) – the level of employment increases and thus consumption too. 
Third, the Keynesian multiplier effects act in the opposite way to the case without redistribution. 
They generate a virtuous cycle for growth: more economic activity leads to more employment, 
consumption and investment, which in turn leads to more economic activity. This virtuous cycle can 
be maintained as long as inflationary pressures are not too high.
Higher GDP means more employment (see Figure 15.A), which leads to higher wage increases. 
The resulting increase in production costs leads to more inflation. This explains why the consumer 
and the energy prices are higher in S2 than in S1B (see Figure 15.B & C). As GDP is higher in S2 
compared to S1B, CO
2
 emissions are logically higher when the revenue of the tax is redistributed 
(see Figure 15.D). This is a classic example of a rebound effect: more economic activity means more 
production and more household consumption, which means more energy consumption. Yet this 
rebound effect is relatively small as the increase in CO
2
 emissions is relatively limited. This result is 
quite interesting. It shows that it is possible to implement a carbon tax in a way that is acceptable 
economically (and therefore politically) without forgoing much of the potential offered by the 
tax in terms of environmental dividend. In other words, the model shows that substitution effects 
induced by changes in relative prices can affect energy consumption in larger proportion than 
the revenue effect (caused by the fiscal revenue transfers). Of course, this result depends on the 
capacity of the economy to adapt to the change in energy prices, as captured in the simulation by 
the elasticity of substitution parameter. We thus investigate in the sensitivity analysis (Section 4.5) 
how these results change when we retain alternative levels of substitution.
Figure 16 shows the impact of a change in the energy mix by comparing scenarios S3 to S2. Both 
S2 and S3 scenarios assume full redistribution of tax revenues and the same carbon tax level (see 
Table 8). As summarized in Table 7, S2 assumes a renewable-intensive electricity mix where 75% 
of the mix is from renewables by 2050 (TMIX-RENEW). By contrast, scenario S3 retains the fossil-
intensive electricity mix where 75% of the mix is from natural gas by 2050 (TMIX-FOSSIL). The 
renewable-intensive scenario S2 leads to a higher GDP (see Figure 12.A) and lower CO
2
 emissions 
compared to the fossil-intensive scenario S3[31] (see Figure 16.B). This result is logical. On the one 
hand, more renewable (resp. fossil) energy in the electricity mix means a reduction (resp. increase) 
[30] In fact, the average real revenue decreases slightly because the tax base shrinks as fossil energy is substituted by other 
commodities. This means that the amount redistributed becomes smaller while at the same time the substitution is 
not at a high enough level to offset the increase in energy prices (unless we assume that commodities are perfectly 
substitutable with each other, that is to say, a level of elasticity of substitution tending to infinity). 
[31] All scenarios produce the same results until 2020 because the mix is almost the same across all scenarios until this date.
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Figure 16  GDP, Energy price, Energy demand and Carbon tax price
Figure 17  Carbon tax revenue and Public deficit, in % of GDP
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of CO
2
 emissions from the electricity sector, which for a given aggregate electricity demand leads 
to less (resp. more) CO
2
 emissions at the aggregate level. On the other hand, more renewable 
energy in the electricity mix in the context of an increase of the price of fossil energy (because 
of the carbon tax) leads to a lower energy price in S2 compared to S3 (see Figure 16.C). This has a 
positive effect on consumer purchasing power and the competitiveness of economic sectors. This 
explains why the economic activity is more favorable in S2. Of course, higher economic activity also 
means more energy consumption, which produces a rebound effect. This can be seen in Figure 16.B 
where the decrease in energy consumption is smaller in S2 than in S3. However, this rebound effect 
is too weak to reverse the CO
2
 emissions reduction made possible by the greater penetration of 
renewable energy: emissions are still lower in S2 compared to S3. This result suggests that, in the 
context of higher fossil energy prices, efforts to enhance the penetration of renewable energy are 
more efficient both economically and environmentally.
The carbon tax revenue in S2 and S3 represents from 5% to 6% of GDP in 2050 (See Figure 17.A), 
while the value-added tax revenue represents 3.7% of GDP over the same period. The tax revenue 
is higher in S3 compared to S2 since emissions are higher due to the intensive use of natural gas 
in the electricity mix. It should be remembered that, in these scenarios, the carbon tax revenue is 
redistributed by decreasing other taxes. Ex ante, payroll tax and income tax are reduced to keep 
total tax collection at the initial level. Ex post, any change in the public deficit is due to endogenous 
adjustment and depends on how the policy affects other variables. The difference in how the 
public deficit evolves in S2 and S3 depends chiefly on the evolution of GDP: in S2, GDP improves 
compared to the baseline scenario, whereas the contrary is true for S3.
4 4  Sectoral results
The aforementioned macroeconomic results show that redistributing the carbon tax revenues has 
the advantage of generating a double dividend. Additionally, both dividends are higher when this 
fiscal policy is coupled with the development of renewables in electricity production. This result can 
be seen in Figure 18: the average employment creation per year is higher in S2 with more reduction 
of CO
2
 emissions. Almost all sectors benefit from the measures, particularly the labor-intensive 
sectors such as services, industry and electric power.
Moreover, the electric power sector that has a high level of renewables is more labor-intensive 
than the fossil fuel sectors. This explains why the loss of employment in fossil fuel sectors is limited 
with the implementation of a carbon tax (see Figure 18.A), contrary to what happens in the energy 
sectors that are capital-intensive. Indeed, the decrease in energy demand penalizes the activity of 
fossil fuel sectors and therefore their investment (see Figure 19.A). All other sectors benefit from 
the increase in economic activity driven by the compensation of households and industry and 
the increase in their investments. As the carbon tax is introduced in all sectors, CO
2
 emissions fall 
across the whole economy (see Figure 18.B). The impact on aggregate CO
2
 emission is higher in 
S2, even though the reduction of total energy consumption is lower in S2 due to a higher GDP 
(see Figure 19.B).
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Figure 18  Employment and CO
2
 emissions by sector
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Figure 19  Investment and Energy consumption by sector
GRAPH B
ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
BY SECTORS IN 2050
%  Difference from BAU
Agriculture, livestock, fishing and forestry
Industry
Transport
Trade, service and government
Oil and gas extraction
Refining and coal
Natural gas
Electric power
TOTAL
S2
S3
-90% -80% -70% -60% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0%
GRAPH A
AVERAGE INVESTMENT 
PER YEAR, 2015-2050
In million pesos, Difference from BAU
Agriculture, livestock, fishing and forestry
Industry
Transport
Trade, service and government
Oil and gas extraction
Refining and coal
Natural gas
Electric power
TOTAL
-200 000 -100 000 0 100 000 200 000 300 000 400 000
S2
S3
50
4 5 Sensitivity analysis
In the sensitivity analysis, we examine scenario S2 for all the cases shown in Table 10. The base case 
(case 0) considers the assumptions and parameters taken into account in Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
In case 1, the assumption on endogenous energy efficiency is removed. The sensitivity parameter 
between “the elasticity of substitution between capital and energy” and their relative price is equal 
to 1.5 in the base case but to 0 in case 1. The elasticity of substitution between capital and energy 
thus remains constant throughout the entire simulation period at 0.6. Case 2 integrates case 1 plus 
a change in value of the elasticity of substitution between final consumption goods. This elasticity 
is equal to 1 in case 0 and to 0.5 in case 2. Case 3 provides a sensitivity analysis on the elasticity 
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods for each type of use (e.g., intermediary 
consumption, investment, final consumption and public investment). While the base case assumes 
0.8, case 3 assumes 1. In case 4, we consider change in competitiveness. In the base case, export 
elasticity is 0.6. In case 4, it is 0.8. Finally, case 5 analyses the sensitivity of wages to the unemployment 
rate. Case 5 adopts an elasticity of 0.3 and case 0 assumes 0.1.
Table 10  Sensitivity analyses: changes in assumptions
Description
Value 
Case 0
Value 
Case 0 Base case
Case 1
Sensitivity to relative price in the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and energy
1.5 0
Case 2 Case 1 + Elasticity of substitution between final consumption goods 1 0.5
Case 3 The Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 0.8 1
Case 4 Export Elasticity 0.6 0.8
Case 5 Wage elasticity, sensitivity to the unemployment rate 0.1 0.3
Figure 20  GDP and CO
2
 emissions from energy consumption 
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The results in Figure 20 show that changes in assumptions of elasticities between capital and energy 
and between consumption goods affect the double dividend in the medium and long term. In 
particular, removing the endogenous energy efficiency (case 1) leads to higher CO
2
 emissions 
compared to case 0. We observe a gap of more than 10% by the end of the period. If we consider 
case 2, which additionally includes a halving of the elasticity of substitution between final 
consumption goods, this gap is doubled (See Figure 20.B). The whole economy is rigid, while sectors 
and households struggle to adapt to higher energy prices. The impact on GDP is limited until 2045, 
but thereafter we observe a negative effect caused by the higher cost of energy bills due to low 
flexibility. Agents are unable to further reduce their energy consumption. This implies that their 
investment choices preclude any deep adaptation to a large shift in relative prices. The rigidity of 
investment, induced by a constant low elasticity of substitution between capital and energy, is the 
cause of the loss in activity and the concomitant lower environmental dividend (See Figure 20.A). 
Other simulations, which are not reported here due to space limits, show that an opposite outcome 
is achieved when a flexible economy assumed: in particular GDP and the emissions reduction are 
higher when rigidity of the economic setting is removed
Cases 3, 4 and 5 have no impact on the environmental dividend. Reductions in CO
2
 emissions from 
energy consumption remain at the same level as in the base case (not shown), for same reasons as 
already mentioned: the substitution effects due to changes in relative prices have more impact on 
energy consumption than the revenue effect (here a lower GDP); in other words, rebound effects 
are much smaller than substitution effects.
The assumption underlying the Armington elasticity is that domestic goods and imported goods 
are imperfect substitutes. Higher elasticities in case 3 are equivalent to a decrease in trade barriers 
Because foreign prices are less expensive[32] than domestic prices, agents import more and thus 
penalize national activity. However this negative effect is lower than in case 4 and case 5. In case 4, 
[32] Note that we assume that the rest of the world does not follow a carbon tax policy.
Figure 21  GDP and consumption price
GRAPH B
CONSUMPTION PRICE
% Difference 
from BAU
20
14
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
CASE_0 CASE_3 CASE_4 CASE_5
-1.5%
-2.0%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
GRAPH A
GDP
% Difference 
from BAU
20
14
20
20
20
26
20
32
20
38
20
44
20
50
CASE_0 CASE_3 CASE_4 CASE_5
52
the impact of the relative price between export prices[33] and world prices for external demand[34] 
increases. Since export prices are higher than world prices, external demand decreases more 
compared to case 0, affecting GDP negatively (See Figure 21). In case 5, wages are more strongly 
related to the unemployment rate than in case 0. In the event of lower unemployment, the 
bargaining power of trade unions is reinforced, leading to steeper wage rises, which then affect 
production costs and thus inflation. That explains why the consumption price is higher is case 5 
than in the base case (see Figure 21.B). This means that the inflationary pressure resulting from 
the taxation policy reverses the economic gain because the Mexican economy is less competitive 
externally.
[33] This depends on the production cost and reflects the price competitiveness of domestic products.
[34] Under the assumption of a “small open economy”, external demand and the export price are negatively related for a 
given world price. 
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5  Conclusions
Our results show that a double dividend is possible. A carbon tax will incentivize the energy transition 
and low-emission development of the Mexican economy, achieving at the same time higher levels 
of social welfare through policies that ensure an appropriate redistribution of the carbon tax 
revenues. How large these benefits will be and how fast they can be achieved will depend on the 
readiness and flexibility of the production and consumption sectors. The sooner Mexico triggers a 
change of relative prices by sending explicit atmospheric scarcity signals, the sooner investments in 
energy efficiency and clean energy will start, followed by wide-sweeping changes in production and 
consumption patterns. Long-term public policy commitments are needed in order to give clarity 
and certainty to the economic actors so that they will engage in the necessary technological and 
behavioral changes.
So far, Mexico has built the institutional framework needed to put its national climate policies 
in order. This is certainly a necessary condition, but it is not enough. The final step to ensure a 
real coherence with its climate goals is to start fully implementing carbon price policies such as 
an emission-trading scheme and a bold carbon tax. On the latter count, our research shows that 
constant increases in the current carbon tax up to US$30/tCO
2
 by 2020 and to US$100/tCO
2
 
by 2030 will create the necessary and sufficient conditions for engaging on the path to a totally 
decarbonized economy by 2050. On this basis, the model forecasts higher rates of growth that 
show annual differences of up to 2.5% compared to the baseline scenario. In absolute values, this 
means that Mexico could ultimately attain annual growth rates of more than 3.9%, which would lift 
the country out of the middle-income trap in the years to come.
Despite Mexico’s significant efforts, time is running out for the country to change its development 
pathway and the coming years will be critical in terms of making the right investment choices. 
Mexico is at a crossroads: either it implements the above-mentioned climate policies and creates 
the conditions for the growth of a clean energy industry, or it continues on the business-as-usual 
pathway with a soft transition, deferring crucial investments and becoming locked-in to fossil fuel 
technologies. The soft option carries high risks given the high costs involved in changing producer 
and consumer patterns that cannot to adapt rapidly to a world that will soon be implementing 
severe restrictions on carbon emissions.
Mexico recently presented its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Its proposal states unconditional 
GHG mitigation of 22% compared to a baseline by 2030 and conditional mitigation of up to 
36% for the same year. According to Mexico’s INDC proposal, the conditional target is subject 
to an international agreement on carbon price policies, carbon border adjustments, technical 
cooperation, access to low cost financial resources, and technology transfer. Clearly, all these 
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conditions are necessary but it is quite unlikely that this will be the outcome of COP21. Mexico 
should not wait for all this to happen in order to begin its own decisive transition. Even in a world 
where the convergence of international agreements to tackle climate change is slow, these policies 
still make good economic sense. As shown by the results of this paper, early action will reduce 
emissions and go hand in hand with domestic environmental, social and economic benefits that 
clearly offset the costs of implementation.
In terms of next steps for research, there are still relevant issues that future works may want to 
address. In order to have a more comprehensive picture of the consequences of the energy and 
climate policies, INECC needs to continue working with the ThreeME model. One important issue 
to be solved involves carbon tax predictions in the long run. The model predicts a carbon tax of 
around US$700/tCO
2
 for the year 2050. This high cost is related, among other variables, to the 
technology costs faced by industry, as this sector fails to change over time in all scenarios. Decreasing 
cost trends must be included in the next modeling exercises. Regarding the foreign sector, the 
model predicts a loss of competitiveness and a drop in exports. This is linked to the assumption 
of whether or not the world commits to reduce GHG emissions. In order to have more realistic 
scenarios, different assumptions on the degrees of commitment of the rest of world need to be 
adopted. A further issue is that distributional effects are not within the scope of this assessment. 
It is absolutely vital to disaggregate households by income in order to see the level of regressivity 
or progressivity of the carbon tax. The availability of new information such as the new 2012 input-
output matrix will update the modeling to a different base year. It is also crucial to disaggregate 
the transport sector, as was done for the electricity sector. Exogenous technological changes to 
the on-road fleet will enable us to identify the impacts of specific policies, such as regulations or 
government programs to change auto fleet technology. Finally, continuous modeling efforts are 
still needed in order to establish the right price elasticities that provide a better fit with the national 
context, and to produce a more sophisticated Mexican version of the ThreeME model.
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6  Appendix
Table 11  Summary table, Scenario Business as Usual (BAU) 
VARIABLE 2008 2013 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real GDP (in million pesos) 1 12 256 864 13 426 992 13 954 396 15 580 633 21 358 495 30 259 340 40 678 583
Value-added market sector  
(in million pesos)
2 10 903 262 11 946 268 12 403 004 13 809 596 18 827 989 26 668 823 35 894 583
Household consumption  
(In million pesos)
3 8 250 896 9 175 204 9 454 943 10 318 826 13 572 980 19 148 618 25 448 829
Investment (in million pesos) 4 2 830 420 3 096 765 3 201 895 3 515 697 4 720 294 6 897 760 9 730 182
Investment (commercial 
sectors, in million pesos)
5 955 531 1 055 986 1 091 231 1 192 694 1 569 538 2 242 917 3 068 145
Exports (in million pesos) 6 3 270 613 3 495 892 3 698 733 4 329 766 6 332 385 8 776 865 11 568 147
Imports (in million pesos) 7 3 600 182 3 953 769 4 107 160 4 576 892 6 164 280 8 556 743 11 256 981
Real household income  
(in million pesos)
8 9 281 214 10 284 620 10 622 896 11 620 505 15 298 377 21 528 634 28 617 281
Saving rate 9 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Household consumption price 10 1.00 1.15 1.22 1.41 1.89 2.53 3.30
Production price 11 1.00 1.14 1.21 1.39 1.88 2.51 3.27
Export price 12 1.00 1.15 1.22 1.41 1.90 2.54 3.32
Import price 13 1.00 1.13 1.20 1.39 1.88 2.55 3.45
Real wage (in million pesos) 14 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.21
Real Labor Cost  
(in million pesos)
15 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
Employment 16 47 439 094 50 467 400 51 617 151 54 263 005 58 544 436 61 681 232 64 035 869
Unemployment rate 17 4.16% 4.15% 4.11% 4.07% 4.22% 4.42% 4.36%
Trade balance (points of GDP) 18 -2.69 -3.08 -2.44 -1.14 1.09 0.57 -0.36
Public deficit (points of GDP) 19 -1.73 -1.00 -1.06 -1.41 -1.95 -1.95 -2.19
Public debt (points of GDP) 20 31.07 30.29 29.54 28.69 29.20 30.49 33.88
GDP index 21 100 110 114 127 174 247 332
CO
2
 emissions (MtCO
2
) 22 415 455 468 505 584 676 715
Sector 23 287 327 338 363 412 448 432
Household 24 128 128 131 142 172 228 283
CO
2
 emissions (index 2008) 25 100 110 113 122 141 163 172
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Table 12  Summary table, Scenario 1A
VARIABLE 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real GDP (% difference from BAU) 1 -0.03 -0.61 0.88 1.50 -0.29
Value-added market sector (% difference from BAU) 2 -0.06 -0.78 0.82 1.46 -0.47
Household consumption (% difference from BAU) 3 -0.04 -1.06 0.58 2.26 1.07
Investment (% difference from BAU) 4 -0.11 -0.52 5.58 7.41 1.75
Investment (commercial sectors, % difference from BAU) 5 -0.01 -0.55 0.36 2.26 1.37
Exports (% difference from BAU) 6 0.00 -0.18 -1.34 -2.75 -3.42
Imports (% difference from BAU) 7 -0.07 -0.89 1.13 2.91 1.47
Real household income (% difference from BAU) 8 -0.06 -1.10 0.60 2.15 0.97
Saving rate (difference from BAU) 9 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.09
Household consumption price (% difference from BAU) 10 0.05 0.96 3.67 6.66 7.66
Production price (% difference from BAU) 11 -0.01 0.60 3.53 6.64 7.67
Export price (% difference from BAU) 12 0.00 0.58 2.91 5.25 6.04
Import price (% difference from BAU) 13 -0.01 0.11 0.31 0.20 0.07
Real wage (% difference from BAU) 14 -0.06 -0.48 2.96 5.60 5.76
Real labor cost (% difference from BAU) 15 0.00 -0.13 2.68 5.15 5.43
Employment 16 -9 404 -187 420 1 240 467 1 846 604 311 692
Unemployment rate (difference from BAU) 17 0.01 0.19 -1.17 -1.51 -0.21
Trade balance (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 18 0.02 0.34 -0.01 -0.23 0.25
Public deficit (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 19 -0.07 -0.50 -1.07 -1.46 -1.35
Public debt (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 20 -0.07 -1.87 -7.95 -15.15 -19.97
GDP (index 2008) 21 114 126 176 251 331
CO
2
 emissions (MtCO
2
) 22 464 461 510 596 652
CO
2
 emissions (% difference from BAU) 23 -0.95 -8.80 -12.63 -11.91 -8.76
Sector (% difference from BAU) 24 -1.18 -9.42 -16.00 -17.62 -14.06
Household (% difference from BAU) 25 -0.37 -7.21 -4.52 -0.70 -0.69
CO
2
 emissions (index 2008) 26 112 111 123 143 157
Carbon tax value (in pesos 2008) 27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real carbon tax revenue (in pesos) 28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Carbon tax revenue (points of GDP) 29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 13  Summary table, Scenario 1B
VARIABLE 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real GDP (% difference from BAU) 1 -0.10 -1.54 -3.00 -4.94 -8.35
Value-added market sector (% difference from BAU) 2 -0.15 -1.90 -3.61 -5.87 -9.64
Household consumption (% difference from BAU) 3 -0.16 -2.57 -4.84 -6.27 -9.57
Investment (% difference from BAU) 4 -0.18 -1.55 0.30 -1.06 -5.42
Investment (commercial sectors, % difference from BAU) 5 -0.04 -1.36 -4.04 -5.60 -8.68
Exports (% difference from BAU) 6 -0.01 -0.45 -3.15 -6.55 -10.19
Imports (% difference from BAU) 7 -0.18 -2.15 -3.26 -4.14 -6.61
Real household income (% difference from BAU) 8 -0.25 -2.73 -4.89 -6.51 -9.94
Saving rate (difference from BAU) 9 -0.08 -0.15 -0.05 -0.23 -0.37
Household consumption price (% difference from BAU) 10 0.24 2.23 8.42 15.68 23.20
Production price (% difference from BAU) 11 0.06 1.60 7.94 15.32 23.41
Export price (% difference from BAU) 12 0.05 1.40 6.91 13.59 21.83
Import price (% difference from BAU) 13 0.01 0.27 0.58 0.45 0.18
Real wage (% difference from BAU) 14 -0.25 -1.35 -0.08 -0.76 -4.79
Real labor cost (% difference from BAU) 15 -0.08 -0.73 0.07 -0.71 -5.02
Employment 16 -19 390 -524 952 -817 984 -1 653 862 -3 755 556
Unemployment rate (difference from BAU) 17 0.03 0.55 0.70 1.45 3.14
Trade balance (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 18 0.06 0.81 1.66 2.48 3.99
Public deficit (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 19 -0.35 -1.52 -3.04 -4.90 -6.82
Public debt (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 20 -0.37 -5.09 -21.10 -43.13 -72.00
GDP (index 2008) 21 114 125 169 235 304
CO
2
 emissions (MtCO
2
) 22 457 410 353 282 175
CO
2
 emissions (% difference from BAU) 23 -2.37 -18.80 -39.51 -58.28 -75.47
Sector (% difference from BAU) 24 -2.16 -17.31 -38.08 -55.10 -71.00
Household (% difference from BAU) 25 -2.91 -22.61 -42.94 -64.53 -82.26
CO
2
 emissions (index 2008) 26 110 99 85 68 42
Carbon tax value (in pesos 2008) 27 100 500 1 500 3 969 10 500
Real carbon tax revenue (in pesos) 28 45 585 204 532 523 945 1 098 192 1 795 778
Carbon tax revenue (points of GDP) 29 0.33 1.33 2.53 3.82 4.82
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Table 14  Summary table, Scenario 2
VARIABLE 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real GDP (% difference from BAU) 1 0.04 0.39 2.12 2.26 0.37
Value-added market sector (% difference from BAU) 2 -0.01 0.11 1.77 1.64 -0.62
Household consumption (% difference from BAU) 3 0.05 0.47 3.18 5.30 5.29
Investment (% difference from BAU) 4 -0.10 0.15 6.31 8.27 6.33
Investment (commercial sectors, % difference from BAU) 5 0.05 0.68 3.01 5.38 5.34
Exports (% difference from BAU) 6 0.01 -0.24 -2.69 -6.81 -12.08
Imports (% difference from BAU) 7 -0.08 -0.38 1.74 3.55 3.68
Real household income (% difference from BAU) 8 0.07 0.42 3.11 5.03 4.83
Saving rate (difference from BAU) 9 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.23 -0.39
Household consumption Price (% difference from BAU) 10 0.20 2.11 8.66 18.67 32.14
Production price (% difference from BAU) 11 0.01 1.37 8.02 18.23 32.58
Export price (% difference from BAU) 12 -0.06 0.80 6.16 14.67 27.41
Import price (% difference from BAU) 13 0.01 0.26 0.57 0.44 0.19
Real wage (% difference from BAU) 14 -0.20 -0.72 3.47 6.53 6.86
Real labor cost (% difference from BAU) 15 -0.66 -2.72 -1.43 -1.03 -3.11
Employment 16 18 568 404 102 2 323 170 2 881 006 1 789 856
Unemployment rate (difference from BAU) 17 -0.02 -0.43 -2.10 -2.37 -1.42
Trade Balance (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 18 0.01 0.21 0.17 0.57 1.78
Public deficit (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 19 0.04 0.26 -0.21 -0.53 -0.71
Public debt (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 20 0.00 0.34 -1.49 -6.11 -10.50
GDP (index 2008) 21 114 128 178 252 333
CO
2
 emissions (MtCO
2
) 22 458 420 378 311 197
CO
2
 emissions (% difference from BAU) 23 -2 -17 -35 -54 -72
Sector (% difference from BAU) 24 -2 -15 -34 -51 -68
Household (% difference from BAU) 25 -3 -20 -38 -60 -79
CO
2
 Emissions (index 2008) 26 110 101 91 75 47
Carbon Tax Value (in pesos 2008) 27 100 500 1 500 3 969 10 500
Real carbon tax revenue (in pesos) 28 45 666 209 861 561 216 1 204 463 1 991 931
Carbon tax revenue (points of GDP) 29 0.33 1.34 2.57 3.89 4.88
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Table 15  Summary table, Scenario 3
VARIABLE 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Real GDP (% difference from BAU) 1 0.04 0.30 -0.03 -0.97 -2.66
Value-added market sector (% difference from BAU) 2 0.00 0.04 -0.53 -1.82 -3.94
Household consumption (% difference from BAU) 3 0.05 0.46 0.75 0.79 -0.21
Investment (% difference from BAU) 4 -0.05 -0.22 -0.81 -2.40 -1.04
Investment (commercial sectors, % difference from BAU) 5 0.05 0.67 1.08 1.47 2.09
Exportations (% difference from BAU) 6 0.01 -0.21 -1.75 -4.14 -8.84
Importations (% difference from BAU) 7 -0.06 -0.36 -0.66 -0.97 -0.83
Real household income (% difference from BAU) 8 0.07 0.41 0.66 0.58 -0.65
Saving rate (difference from BAU) 9 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.18 -0.40
Household consumption price (% difference from BAU) 10 0.21 1.96 6.44 12.71 25.19
Production price (% difference from BAU) 11 0.02 1.18 5.68 12.22 26.21
Export price (% difference from BAU) 12 -0.04 0.67 3.80 8.68 20.34
Import price (% difference from BAU) 13 0.02 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.14
Real wage (% difference from BAU) 14 -0.21 -0.81 -0.27 -0.83 -3.69
Real labour cost (% difference from BAU) 15 -0.67 -2.82 -5.45 -9.69 -15.48
Employment 16 21 957 338 786 519 259 342 224 -76 937
Unemployment rate (difference from BAU) 17 -0.03 -0.35 -0.46 -0.28 0.07
Trade balance (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 18 0.01 0.19 0.56 1.18 2.46
Public deficit (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 19 0.03 0.26 0.38 0.53 0.43
Public debt (difference from BAU in points of GDP) 20 -0.02 0.34 1.86 3.30 2.97
GDP (index 2008) 21 114 128 174 244 323
CO
2
 emissions (MtCO
2
) 22 459 428 410 352 220
CO
2
 emissions (% difference from BAU) 23 -2 -15 -30 -48 -69
Sector (% difference from BAU) 24 -2 -13 -26 -41 -62
Household (% difference from BAU) 25 -3 -20 -39 -62 -80
CO
2
 emissions (index 2008) 26 111 103 99 85 53
Carbon tax value (in pesos 2008) 27 100 500 1 500 3 969 10 500
Real carbon tax revenue (In pesos) 28 45 746 213 979 612 034 1 381 017 2 253 422
Carbon tax revenue (points of GDP) 29 0.33 1.37 2.87 4.61 5.69
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an application of the ThreeME model
Simultaneously achieving climate protection, energy security and economic development to address 
the long-term wellbeing of individuals, while reducing their exposure to significant environmental risks 
and challenges, is at the core of the low-carbon policy agenda worldwide.
Forecast to be one of the largest energy consumers and energy-related CO
2
 emitters in the near future, 
the Mexican economy is particularly concerned by the urgent need for a rapid shift towards low-carbon 
development pathways, which involve switching to sustainable energy systems. 
To assess the opportunities associated with transitioning to a low-carbon economy and avoid the 
potentially high costs of this transition, what is lacking or insufficiently developed is a robust research 
framework, which allows to investigate alternative future pathways of the energy, environmental and 
technology dimensions of developmental challenges and their solutions.
This study aims to provide such a framework by offering a dynamic general equilibrium modeling 
analysis that quantitatively builds the link between the energy economy and the environment in 
Mexico. As such, its purpose is to inform the design of effective policy aimed at promoting sustainable 
environmental management while still boosting economic growth in the medium- and long-term. 
To do so, the study develops a Mexican version of the Multi-sector Macroeconomic Model for the 
Evaluation of Environmental and Energy policy (Three-ME) and uses it to assess the long-term effect 
of policy measures implemented under Mexico’s “Climate Change Law” (e.g., carbon tax) on the energy 
sector’s structure and dynamics, on related greenhouse gas emissions, and on economic activity. The 
study takes the next step of assessing the redistributive effects of alternative policy scenarios, each 
 reflecting a different strategy for recycling tax revenues. 
Interestingly, it is found that implementing a carbon tax on the Mexican economy acts so as to curb 
carbon emissions while still increasing social welfare, under certain carbon tax revenue recycling schemes. 
These findings support the double-dividend hypothesis, which assumes that “green” taxation allows to 
simultaneously achieve environmental and socio-economic goals.
T
ra
ns
it
io
ni
ng
 t
ow
ar
ds
 a
 lo
w
-c
ar
bo
n 
ec
on
om
y 
in
 M
ex
ic
o:
  
an
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 T
hr
ee
M
E 
m
od
el
3
November 2015
Etudes de l’AFD
No3
Dennis Gastelum Rivera, Jorge Gutiérrez García 
Thalia Hernández Amezcua, Carolina Inclán Acevedo,  
Iván Islas Cortés (INECC), Gissela Landa (OFCE) 
Frédéric Reynès (TNO) 
 
Editors: Fabio Grazi, François-Xavier Bellocq (AFD)EDITORS 
Fabio Grazi, AFD 
François-Xavier Bellocq, AFD 
 
AUTHORS 
Dennis Gastelum Rivera, Jorge Gutiérrez García,  
Thalia Hernández Amezcua, Carolina Inclán Acevedo,  
Iván Islas Cortés, INECC 
Gissela Landa, OFCE 
Frédéric Reynès, TNO
